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“I have to get up at 4 a.m. and work up to 10 p.m. I
wash the laundry, clean the house, do the dishes, buy
things at the market, and look after the children. I am
told I get GNF 15,000 [about $2.50] per month, but I
have never seen that money. Shortly after I came, I fell
sick. The lady accused me of faking it and refusing to
work. Since that day, I have often been sick but I never
say so. I am beaten. When I take too long here, I may
be beaten. Whenever I want to take a rest, the lady
says I did not come to rest, but to work, and beats me
with an electric cord or a piece of tire and pulls my
ears. It happens as soon as I take a break.” –
Fourteen-year-old Thérèse I. 1
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INTRODUCTION

The most abusive forms of child labor are often thought to be
trafficking for sexual exploitation or excessive working hours in
factories. While these labor abuses do exist, the reality is that some of
the most abusive forms of child labor occur in the private homes of
wealthy and middle-class families in the form of domestic work. If it is
true that criminals are best deterred by the likelihood of apprehension,2
then governments are complicit in some of the most abusive forms of
child labor by their continued failure to appropriately regulate the
domestic work industry and criminalize those that exploit child
workers, as required by widely-ratified international conventions. 3
Due to the isolated environment of their job, domestic workers
(“DW” or “DWs”) are inherently less able to organize, bargain, and
push for improved legal protections. These problems are often
compounded due to age, education, gender, socio-economic status,
race, and migration status. 4 Abuses are not relegated only to countries
2. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 1975-2025 42 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013).
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. Peggie R. Smith, Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent Work
for Domestic Workers, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 161 (2011); see also Virginia
Mantouvalou, Human Rights for Precarious Workers: The Legislative Precariousness of
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with limited resources or governance: the worst forms of child labor,
abusive working conditions, and human trafficking continue to occur
in industrialized nations including the United States, France, and the
Netherlands. 5 Promulgation of the International Labour Organization’s
(“ILO”) Convention 189 (“C189”) was an organizational success for
domestic workers and their advocates, and it thrust regulation and
oversight of the industry into the realm of State governments, who had
long ignored or dismissed it. 6 Despite this, domestic workers like
Thérèse remain particularly vulnerable. Because they are still often
seen as part of the informal labor force, many countries do not extend
labor protections to domestic workers, particularly migrants. 7 Nor do
many countries effectively prosecute, investigate or even criminalize
abuse of domestic workers. 8 While twenty-four states ratified C189,
the majority have not taken action at all. 9 Prevention of the worst forms

Domestic Labor, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 133, 138 (2012); Ana Virgínia et al., Regulatory
Challenges of Domestic Work: The Case of Brazil 14 (LLDRL Working Paper Series, WP No.
3, 2009).
5. See generally SAMEERA HAVIZ & MICHAEL PAARLBERG, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES
& NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALL., THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING OF DOMESTIC WORKERS IN
THE UNITED STATES, FINDINGS FROM BEYOND THE SURVIVAL CAMPAIGN 10 (Narbada Chhetri
et al., eds., 2017); see also Alexandra Ricard-Guay, Trafficking in Domestic Work: Looking at
the Demand-Side 12 (DemandAT, Working Paper No. 5, Mar. 2016) (noting that child domestic
labor has been identified in France and the Netherlands, though very little case law exists).
6. See generally Einat Albin & Virginia Mantouvalou, The ILO Convention on Domestic
Workers: From the Shadows to the Light, INDUS. L. J., Mar. 2012, at 67; see also Int’l. Labour
Org. [ILO], Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent
of Legal Protection 19 (2013). [hereinafter Domestic Workers Across the World].
7. There are many historical (U.S.) and contemporary (Lebanon and Saudi Arabia)
examples of domestic workers being excluded from labor protections. Human Rights Watch,
[HRW], Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers With Children Deported, (Apr. 25, 2017,12:01
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/25/lebanon-migrant-domestic-workers-childrendeported (“The estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are excluded from
labor law protections”) [https://perma.cc/ZNL7-57Y7]; Human Rights Watch, [HRW], Saudi
Arabia: Steps Toward Migrant Workers’ Rights (Nov. 15, 2015, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/15/saudi-arabia-steps-toward-migrant-workers-rights
(“Saudi Arabia’s recent labor reforms may help curb rampant abuses, but they exclude domestic
workers and institutionalize bias against women.”) [https://perma.cc/4BD9-AQ9Y]. For a brief
discussion of the United States Fair Labor Standards Act and its exclusion of domestic workers,
see Eileen Boris, Decent Work in the Home: Affect and Rights Talk, 15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 79, 87 (2017).
8. Ricard-Guay, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that very little case law on trafficking law
exists, and that governments should broaden the scope of trafficking in persons statutes to
effectively prosecute).
9. See infra Section III.A. on Convention 189.
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of abusive labor in domestic work can be complex, and touches human
rights, criminal, labor, and immigration laws.
In contrast to the lack of sympathy afforded to adult domestic
workers, countries are overwhelmingly sympathetic to issues
concerning the eradication of child labor. The UN Convention on the
Rights of Child (“UNCRC”) has 196 parties and 140 signatories, and
the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (“C182”)
has 180 signatories. 10 Many adult domestic workers share experiences
similar to Thérèse’s. 11 However, the extent of legal and social
protections at their disposal may vary depending on their age.
Child domestic work is not always the ‘worst form’ of child
labor. 12 The worst forms of child labor include compulsory labor or
labor that may harm the health, safety, or morals of the child.13
Therefore, in domestic work, the ‘worst forms’ of child labor are
situations in which the child is not able to leave the employment
situation because of force or coercion, or is subject to abusive
10. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv11&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter UNCRC] (alternatively referred to as UNCROC)
[https://perma.cc/NWK8-F2LT]; Ratifications of C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention 1999 (No. 182), INT’L. LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO (last visited
May 14, 2018) [hereinafter Ratifications of C182] [https://perma.cc/Y82K-2NCG].
11. Abuse of domestic workers is distressingly common, and well (if sporadically)
documented. For a report on the global status of abuse of domestic workers, see generally,
Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19. For an overview of abusive labor
conditions in Hong Kong, see JADE ANDERSON & VICTORIA WISNIEWSKI OTERO, JUSTICE
CNT., COMING CLEAN: THE PREVALENCE OF FORCED LABOUR AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR
THE PURPOSE OF FORCED LABOUR AMONGST MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG
(Aideen McLaughlin, ed., 2016).
12. ILO & Int’l Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, [IPEC], Ending Child
Labour in Domestic Work and Protecting Young Workers from Abusive Working Conditions 6
(2013) (“Under Convention No. 182, child domestic work was not explicitly defined as a worst
form of child labour; however, it was acknowledged that some situations could be considered as
worst forms of child labour”) [hereinafter Ending Child Labour]. The worst forms of child labor
are: “(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering
of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; (d) work which, by its
nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals
of children.” ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), art. 3(d), June 17,
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter C182].
13. C182, supra note 12.
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conditions that could harm their health and safety. 14 In the worst cases,
domestic work can amount to human trafficking. 15 To eradicate these
worst practices in child domestic labor, countries must adopt policies
and frameworks for doing so – frameworks that would inherently
improve protections for adult domestic workers. 16
Unlike factory work or agricultural work, domestic work takes
place in a private home, making its regulation different from, and more
challenging than, other industries. The ILO has suggested formalizing
the domestic work economy to prevent abuse in the industry, for
example by requiring written employment contracts and ensuring
access to judicial mechanisms. 17 These protections help to protect
domestic workers against harmful and compelled working
conditions. 18 Human rights, including labor rights, are understood to be
inherent to each individual. 19 Therefore, excluding adult DWs from
protective human rights regimes is not in keeping with the
understanding that human rights apply equitably to all humans. It
would be impractical, if not impossible, to require written employment
contracts for children and not recognize the same contract once the
worker reaches adult age. 20

14. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 14-24; see also C182, supra note 12.
15. Depending on the jurisdiction and relevant statute, trafficking can involve transport
across international borders, or can involve solely domestic activity. For example, in the United
States, the definition of trafficking incorporates fraud and coercion, but not necessarily transport,
as a means through which trafficking can be achieved. 22 U.S. § 7102 (9) (2014); HAVIZ &
PAARLBERG, supra note 5, at 19-21; Hélène Harroff-Tavel & Alix Nasri, ILO, Tricked and
Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East (2013) 41-43.
16. See infra Section VI.A.
17. Agustinus Beo Da Costa, Without Contracts, Domestic Workers’ Rights Unprotected,
ILO, (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/fs/WCMS_464070/lang-en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/C82D-PX2A]; see also ILO, Resolution Concerning Decent
Work and the Informal Economy, 90th Session of the General Conference ¶¶ 28-30 (2002)
[hereinafter Resolution Concerning Decent Work].
18. Advocates have routinely requested these mechanisms to help prevent abusive
employment practices. See Child Labour and Domestic Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Childdomesticlabour/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 14,
2018) [https://perma.cc/Y5T4-JFA4].
19. G.A. Res. 217 A(III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948);
Jean-Michel Servais, Universal Labor Standards and National Cultures, 26 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 35, 36 (2004) (describing ILO activities as a “universal mandate”).
20. This can be even more complicated considering that in many countries, particularly in
rural areas, identity and birth date documents are not provided at birth. SARAH PAOLETTI ET AL.,
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL 44 (2014) Even where documents
are available, they may be forged. Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, supra note 15, at 61.
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Thus, preventing the worst forms of child domestic labor requires
effective oversight of the industry as a whole. The most effective
rights-based advocacy would cement the overlap between child labor
and domestic work in the eyes of policy makers and the broader
community. This Note argues that domestic worker advocates should
utilize international legal frameworks and domestic law pertaining to
eradication of the worst forms of child domestic labor to strengthen the
rights of all domestic workers.
The first objective of this Note is to solidify the connection
between adult and child DWs within a human rights-based framework.
The second objective is to argue that states must take steps to regulate
the industry as a necessary component of their international legal
obligations to eradicate the worst forms of child labor. Part II defines
domestic work and domestic workers, and describes their historical role
as informal caregivers. Part III introduces C189 and its accompanying
Recommendation 201 (“R201”), Convention 182 on the Worst Forms
of Child Labour and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Part IV discusses the legislative precariousness of domestic workers
and elucidates the particular difficulties in regulating the domestic
work industry. Part V highlights the primary legal differences between
adult and child DWs. This Part then describes the numerous similarities
between the two groups to establish a foundation for the approach
advocated in Part VI. Part VI uses the commonalities shared by child
and adult DWs to propose that countries should act on their obligations
to honor and protect particular human rights. This Part also addresses
the hypocrisy of countries who desire ‘on paper’ to protect the most
vulnerable child workers, while failing to implement policies and legal
mechanisms that would oversee the domestic work industry, in which
so many children are kept in abusive forms of child labor. Finally, in
Part VII, this Note provides three broad avenues through which
advocates can push their governments to protect domestic workers
from the worst forms of abusive labor.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM – CHALLENGES IN DEFINING
AND PROTECTING DOMESTIC LABORERS
Though global trends are moving towards the formalization of
domestic work, the lines between domestic work and informal work
can be unclear. It is therefore first necessary to define domestic work,
domestic workers, child domestic workers, and their advocates. These
definitions require a brief review of the social history of the domestic
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work industry as informal work, or an economic activity that is
insufficiently covered by formal legal or practical arrangements. 21
A.

Defining Domestic Work

Nearly a century passed between the creation of the International
Labour Organization in 1919 22 and the formal recognition of domestic
workers’ rights in 2011 in the form of C189 on Decent Work for
Domestic Workers. 23 One of many reasons for the delay is the intimate
nature of the domestic work and workplace. 24 C189 defines a domestic
worker as someone who performs work in or for a household or
households. 25
Though C189 provides a definition of domestic work, identifying
domestic work in practice can be a challenge. In many communities,
children perform domestic work such as cooking, cleaning, and child
care for younger siblings or others as a necessary and accepted part of
life. 26 In impoverished communities, children, often female, are tasked
with caring for their families or others, sometimes earning a small wage
to assist their parents in providing for their families. 27 Even in wealthy
countries, domestic duties are often assigned to women without

21. Resolution Concerning Decent Work, supra note 17, ¶ 3.
22. Origins and History, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/history/lang—en/index.htm (last visited March 17, 2018).
23. ILO, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), 15A/2, PR No. 15A, (June 16,
2011) [hereinafter C189].
24. Manuela Tomei, Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Reflections on Recent
Approaches to Tackle Informality, 23 CAN. J. WOMEN & L., 185, 207 (2011).
25. C189, supra note 23, art. (1)(a)-(b).
26. For more on sibling care, see REKHA MEHRA ET AL., CHILD CARE OPTIONS FOR
WORKING MOTHERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (n.d.), 41-42 (noting that women often left
children in the care of other daughters).
27. “However, across countries and regions, the tasks undertaken by child domestic
workers tend to be divided according to traditional gender roles. This means that girls are usually
required to do ‘indoor’ tasks such as cooking, cleaning and washing, as well as taking on the
‘caring’ roles, such as looking after young children and the elderly.” Jonathan Blagbrough, AntiSlavery Int’l, They Respect Their Animals More: Voices of Child Domestic Workers 17 ( (2007).
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payment. 28 The fight for recognition of domestic work as work 29 has
its roots in gendered beliefs that domestic work is done out of love and
affection, rather than as a means of sustenance. 30
Domestic work is still often seen as part of the informal economy,
as opposed to the formal labor force. The US National Labor Relations
Act, for example, explicitly excludes any individual undertaking work
or service in the home. 31 Domestic work is sometimes seen as training
for a woman’s future role as a mother. 32 This perception leads to a
danger of commodification of women’s labor. 33 This is particularly
true when a domestic worker lives with her employer, as she gives up
various freedoms that would come with living on her own. 34
Even the ILO has historically failed to adequately protect
domestic workers on par with other workers through its international
conventions. Though some conventions expressly includ domestic
service within their scope, many permitt the exclusion of domestic
28. The United States is one of many examples of this. Hila Shamir, Between Home and
Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of Employment Law in Markets of Care, 30 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 404, 455-56 (2009); see Bryce Covert, Putting a Price Tag on Unpaid
Housework, FORBES (May 30, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brycecovert/2012/05/30/
putting-a-price-tag-on-unpaid-housework/#1dcea8a835c6 [https://perma.cc/4C7M-EZHK]; see
also Rebecca M. Horne et al., Time, Money, or Gender? Predictors of the Division of Household
Labour Across Life Stages, SEX ROLES (2017) (finding that women assume more housework
than their male counterparts across all age groups).
29. This phrase describes the conception of domestic work as work like any other
formalized industry, as opposed to domestic labor performed outside of a formal employment
relationship and in the privacy of the home. Asha D’Souza, Int’l Labour Org., Moving Towards
Decent Work for Domestic Workers: An Overview of the ILO’s Work, 23, 73, 81, (working
Paper 2/2010, 2010).
30. Boris, supra note 7, at 83; see also Int’l Labour Conference, [ILC], Report IV(1)Decent Work for Domestic Workers, ¶ 18 (June 16, 2010) (referring to domestic work as a
“labour of love”) [hereinafter Report IV(1)].
31. United States National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1935).
32. ILO & IPEC, Ending Child Labor, supra note 12, at 2.
33. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 164; Shamir, supra note 28, at 434-43.
34. For example, some employers with live-in domestic workers restrict their freedom to
come and go as they please by setting curfews, restricting the time and ability of the worker to
entertain friends at the home or use resources at the home such as the internet or air conditioning,
and restricting private space by requiring the domestic worker to share a room or sleep in a space
used during the day. See Tom Grundy, Hong Kong Domestic Workers Made to Live in
Bathrooms, Closets, on Balconies and Roofs, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (May 10, 2017, 19:45),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/05/10/hong-kong-domestic-workers-made-to-live-inbathrooms-closets-on-balconies-and-roofs/ [https://perma.cc/4ZLM-7HKP]; see also Jun Pang,
HONG
KONG
FREE
PRESS
Aug.
14,
2017,
10:53),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/14/employer-who-prevented-domestic-worker-fromusing-air-con-cyberbullied-says-rights-group/ [https://perma.cc/NK6B-7TK2].
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workers through ‘flexibility clauses.’ 35 The Dominican Republic
refused to extend the 1990 Night Work Convention no. 171 to DWs.
Likewise, the Netherlands refused to extend the 1994 Part-time Work
Convention no. 175 to DWs. 36 States including Bolivia, Chile, Egypt,
France, Guyana, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia refused to extend the
1970 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131 to DWs. 37 The
language of minimum wage statutes in countries including Guatemala,
the Republic of Korea, Lebanon, the Netherlands, and Sri Lanka also
seem to implicitly exclude domestic workers from the minimum wage
in breach of Convention 131’s procedural requirements. 38
B.

A Background on Adult & Child Domestic Workers

Understanding DWs requires understanding the social
underpinnings of how communities value their work. Women account
for eighty-three percent of all domestic workers, 39 and globally one in
every thirteen female wage workers is a domestic worker, a 7.5 percent
total. 40 A domestic worker is defined as a person who performs work
in or for a household or households, while a child domestic worker is
someone who does this work and is between the ages of 5 and 17. 41
This Note uses the term “domestic worker” to refer to all those who
perform work in or for a household(s), regardless of age. Children who
perform chores or unpaid work in their own household are not included
in this definition. 42
35. Flexibility clauses typically require notice of exclusion at the time of ratification.
ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 169.
36. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 20.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id. (“Guatemala, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, the Netherlands and Sri Lanka seem to
exclude domestic workers from the scope of the minimum wage legislation without a clear
indication of fulfilment of procedural requirements under Art. 1, para. 3, of Convention No.
131.”).
39. For this reason and the sake of simplicity, I use feminine pronouns when discussing
domestic workers, while still recognizing that male domestic workers are included in these
figures.
40. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19.
41. C189, supra note 23, art. (1)(a-b); ‘Child labor’ can have different definitions based
on the type of work and age of the child. See What is Child Labor, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm
(last
visited
May
14,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/P6PA-WNKN]. Here I use the term ‘child domestic worker’ to refer to anyone
below the age of 18 undertaking domestic work.
42. C189, supra note 23 art. (1)(c).
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Though domestic work can provide a valuable entry point into the
gainful labor market, poor working conditions and inadequate legal
protections disproportionately affect women and help to perpetuate
gender and wage disparities. 43 During the 1970s, feminists in the
United States led the charge against discrimination in the employment
of women. 44 Following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1970s the
devaluing of particular types of work was also framed around race. 45 A
US Senator on the Labor and Education Committee in the 1970s noted
that “the lack of respect accorded domestics is in many ways an
unfortunate reflection of the value we place on the traditional role of
women in our society.” 46
It is important to briefly note here the role that lack of workable
and affordable child and elderly care options plays in the continued
reliance on domestic workers for care work. 47 The US labor market for
example, makes it difficult for unskilled women to find jobs with
salaries sufficient to cover childcare.48 Lack of child care alternatives

43. Smith, supra note 4, at 161; see also ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 63. For more
on wage disparities see Bangladesh Shishu Adhikar Forum, [BASF], Hidden Slavery: Child
Domestic Work, 47 (Mar. 2016) (noting that in a study conducted in Bangladesh, for all ages
ranges, male child domestic workers made more than their female counterparts).
44. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS
IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 130 (2012).
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Senator Harrison Arlington Williams Jr. (D-NJ)).
47. See DANIEL A. BELL, CHINA’S NEW CONFUCIANISM: POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 72 (2008) (noting that in Hong Kong, preference for foreign domestic
workers may be explained by lack of quality daycare); Arijit Nandi et al.,
The Effect of an Affordable Daycare Program on Health and Economic Well-being in Rajasthan,
India: Protocol for a Cluster-Randomized Impact Evaluation Study, 16 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH,
no. 460, 2016, at 1, 2 (noting that the provision of affordable daycare has the potential to reduce
gender inequality by allowing poor women to join the labor force); ABIGAIL BESS BAKAN &
DAIVA K. STASIULIS, NOT ONE OF THE FAMILY: FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CANADA
107 (1997) (arguing that the Canadian government should recognize the lack of affordable child
care and allow tax deductions for the employment of domestic workers); Rachel Moussié,
WIEGO, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic Development,
Child Care from the Perspective of Women in the Informal Economy 1 (Sep. 2016) (noting that
childcare is inaccessible to and unaffordable for low paid workers, contributing to the cycle of
poverty); NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., LISTENING TO WORKERS: CHILD CARE CHALLENGES IN
LOW WAGE JOBS 5 (June 2014) (noting that women in the United States tend to rely on informal
care by friends, family, or neighbors due to the lack of affordable care options).
48. Shamir, supra note 28, at 440-41; see also Daniela Del Boca, The Impact of Child
Care Costs and Availability on Mothers’ Labor Supply 15 (ImPRovE Working Paper No. 15/04,
2015) (“In the U.S. . . . mothers’ labor supply is quite sensitive to costs variations.”).
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may cause an employer to call for domestic workers to work long
hours.
Domestic workers tend to migrate from poorer areas to wealthier
ones. 49 In addition to the type of work they undertake, domestic
workers are rendered uniquely vulnerable because of an intersection of
migration, education, race, socio-economic status and often gender. 50
Employers of domestic workers are often women, “characterized by a
difference of status that the latter is often keen to maintain.” 51 This
further reflects the perception that home and care work is the
responsibility of women. 52
The origins of labor law conceptualized work or labor as
industrialized labor, 53 rather than caring work, which was a historically
female role and one that continues to be undertaken by women. 54
Emotional, physical, and sexual abuse are commonly committed
against domestic workers, particularly those that live with employers. 55
In Brazil, domestic workers are second largest group of female
domestic violence victims after housewives. 56
Without effective support to help break workers out of poverty,
domestic work becomes cyclical, as women pass the role onto their
49. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 2 (“For the majority, a common cross-cutting
factor influencing their engagement in child domestic work – for both girls and boys – is the
extent of the social exclusion and relative poverty of their families and communities.”); see also
Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 29 (“In general, local domestic workers
are younger, come from poorer areas.”); id. at 21 (“Domestic workers generally migrate within
the region, generally from poorer to more prosperous countries.”).
50. Smith, supra note 4, at 165 (“Likewise when women enter receiving countries to work
as domestics, they are commonly relegated to an unequal position in society based on their
gender, race, and class identity.”).
51. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 138.
52. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 25.
53. For example, the US Department of Labor was created in 1913 as a response to poor
conditions in factories. A women’s bureau within the Department was created in 1920,
indicating that the original conception of labor did not necessarily include women’s work. Public
Law No. 259 of June 5, 1920, https://www.dol.gov/wb/info_about_wb/interwb.htm
[https://perma.cc/8V97-PEW5].
54. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55. See infra Part V.B.5. on ‘emotional, physical and sexual abuse.’
56. Virginia et al., supra note 4, at 15. For more on violence against domestic workers in
Brazil, see Creuza Oliveira, A Domestic Worker in Brazil, Real Life Stories, UN,
http://www.un.org/en/letsfightracism/oliveira.shtml [https://perma.cc/8BZL-BBC9]; (last
visited May 14, 2018). See also Virginia Mantouvalou, What Is to Be Done for Migrant
Domestic Workers?, in LABOUR MIGRATION IN HARD TIMES: REFORMING LABOUR MARKET
REGULATION? 141 (Bernard Ryan ed., 2013) (noting that abuse is distressingly common among
migrant workers).

2018]

PROTECTIONS FOR PRECARIOUS AND CDWS

1347

children. Many Sri Lankan women undertake domestic work in Middle
Eastern countries and leave their children with extended family
members, for whom the children work. 57 Other contributing factors that
lead children into domestic work include lack of educational
opportunities, fleeing a forced marriage, domestic violence,
displacement, or the loss of a family member from conflict or disease.58
In addition to explicit exclusions from a number of ILO
Conventions, domestic workers are often excluded from labor laws that
would protect an industrial worker. 59 The home countries from which
migrant workers come are called ‘origin countries’, and the countries
they migrate to are ‘destination countries’. Migrant Domestic Workers
(“MDWs”) may even be subject to different labor standards than other
migrants. 60 DWs may be less likely to expose abuse, pursue a legal case
against employers, or leave an abusive employer if they could be
exposed to deportation, a countersuit or criminal proceedings. 61 This
fear effectively limits their access to the justice system. 62
Some jurisdictions have restrictive visa regimes for domestic
workers. For example, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council63
utilize the Kafala 64 sponsorship system, which links immigration status

57. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP ON CHILD DOMESTIC LABOUR AND TRADE
UNIONS: REPORT 38 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP].
58. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 9.
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 60. For more on statutory exclusions see
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. For more on statutory exclusions see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
61. See HAVIZ & PAARLBERG, supra note 5, at 6, 30 (noting that 78% of interviewees
reported that their employers threatened them with deportation if they complained about work
conditions, but that law HB493/SB178 in Maryland expanded the definition of extortion to
include employers who threaten to report a worker’s immigration status); see also infra note 65
on the Kafala system.
62. See generally Human Rights Watch, Hidden Away: Abuses against Migrant Domestic
Workers in the UK 38-48 (Mar. 30, 2014) (“The fear of deportation is a strong deterrent for them
to report abuse by their employer.”). For a discussion of non-authorized migration see THE
RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (Virginia Mantouvalou ed.,
2015) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO WORK].
63. The Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE"). Charter of the Co-operation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf (with Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council, of the Ministerial
Council and of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes), Bahr.-Kuwait-Oman-Qatar-Saudi
Arabia-U.A.E., May 25, 1981, 1288 U.N.T.S. 151.
64. Also spelled Kefala or niẓām al-kafāla.
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to a particular employer. 65 This gives the employer complete control
over the employee’s ability to change employment or leave the
country. 66
Finally, non-legal problems such as political and cultural barriers
prevent domestic workers from reporting abuse. 67 Where abuse is
reported, legal mechanisms that fail to account for differences in
education, language skills, and financial circumstances can be
ineffective. 68 The culmination of these various identities and lack of
accommodating policies creates social and legal hurdles that can be
nearly impossible for domestic workers to overcome.
This Note uses the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘advocates’ broadly to
incorporate all those working towards improved conditions in the
domestic work industry. Primarily, advocates are trade unions, civil
society organizations, international human rights organizations and
domestic workers themselves. Secondarily, advocates include
government bodies, think tanks, and academics. Advocacy, as used in
this Note, involves a wide variety of methods, including campaigns,
awareness raising, research, academic studies and impact litigation,
among others. These terms are used to give context and color to the
groups and individuals whom have been responsible for DWs’ past
international and domestic legislative successes.

65. The Kafala System is a method of strictly controlling the foreign labor force. In Kafala,
an employer applies for, dictates and controls the terms of stay for a domestic employee, creating
a large power differential. The system was introduced to restrict migration from less wealthy
Arab countries to the UAE, and workers of African or Asian origin were considered “more
docile” and thus preferred. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants, The Kafala: Research on the
Impact and Relation of the Sponsorship System to Migrant Labor Bondage in GCC Countries
24-26 (Sept. 2014).
66. Id. at 24; see also Migrant Forum Asia, Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala
System 1.
67. Int’l Labour Office, Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the
Migrant Workers Instruments, ¶ 489, 105th Session (2016) (“[I]nformation provided by a
number of trade unions stating that it is unreasonable to expect migrant workers to enforce their
rights through the court system without provision of specific assistance . . . the [International
Trade Union Confederation] referred to practical challenges migrant workers may face, such as
limited language skills, inability to meet legal fees and lack of understanding of the country’s
legal system.”).
68. Id. (noting that granting access to justice is the duty of a State, and it is unreasonable
to expect domestic workers who may lack language and financial resources to access it without
assistance).
69. C189, supra note 23, preamble.
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III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Part III covers international law and its provisions that are most
relevant to domestic workers. C189, promulgated in 2011, serves as the
primary source of international law regarding labor standards for
domestic workers. C189 is accompanied by R201, which elaborates on
C189’s underlying rights. Two conventions are of particular relevance
to the eradication of domestic child labor: The UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the ILO Convention 182 on the Eradication of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour.
A.

Convention 189

C189 was promulgated to recognize the undervalued and invisible
domestic work undertaken primarily by women and girls. 69 Though
domestic work was long considered to be the domain of the private
home, as more women enter the labor force, 70 demand for domestic
work has grown, reaching 52.6 million workers in 2010. 71 The
improved ease of migration and improvement of technology facilitating
the sending of remittances makes migrating for domestic work easier
than ever before. Since the early 2000s, high profile cases helped to
shine a light on abuse of domestic workers, particularly where they
were brought to developed countries by foreign diplomats.72
Technology has also helped push domestic workers’ rights to the fore
by enabling DWs to document abuses on cellphones. 73
The ILO first considered legislating on domestic workers in 1948,
and again in 1965, however this never came to fruition. 74 Instead,
during sessions in 1948 and 1965 the Committees settled on passing
resolutions related to the employment of domestic work. 75 In 2007, a
69. C189, supra note 23, preamble.
70. Smith, supra note 4, at 163.
71. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 24.
72. See Frank Langfitt, Servants: Diplomat Held Us as Suburban ‘Slaves’ NPR, Mar. 1,
2007; see also Jo Becker, Strip Search Uproar: What about the Nanny, CNN, Dec. 19, 2013.
See also Steve George, Bangladeshi Diplomat in US Accused of Forcing Servant to Work
Without Pay, CNN, June 4, 2017.
73. See, e.g., Meredith McBride, Hong Kong: Abused Maid Erwiana Says Employer
Should Get Life in Prison, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT, Feb. 11, 2015.
74. Leila Kawar, Making the Machine Work: Technocratic Engineering of Rights for
Domestic Workers at the International Labour Organization, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
483, 495 (2014).
75. ILC, Report IV (1), supra note 30, ¶ 5.
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brief to the ILO Governing Body highlighted the link between domestic
work and its ‘decent work agenda’, which prioritized the elimination
of discrimination in employment, the elimination of forced labor, and
the abolition of child labor. 76 The brief noted that the incidence of child
labor in domestic work was widespread and that “girls dominate in
domestic work.” 77 The brief specifically contemplates an additional
Convention protecting the nearly 100 million global workers under the
age of 18 which would complement C182 and C138, the Minimum Age
Convention. 78 C189 recognizes that child domestic workers, migrant
workers, and live-in workers are at particular risk of exploitation.79
These early movements of C189 show its inherent links to the ILO’s
goal of eradicating child labor.
Some employer groups, 80 where they existed, were opposed to the
creation of a Convention, and disliked standard-setting in the area,
particularly around the provision of social security and labor
inspections. 81 An ILO delegate from Bangladesh doubted whether
employers of domestic workers were sophisticated enough in their
legal knowledge to comply with international labor standards.82
Further, traditionalists at the ILO found the suggestion of setting
domestic work standards as “unexpected and puzzling.” 83
Despite these hesitations, in the first five years after C189 was
promulgated, over seventy ILO member states have taken steps to
improve the situation of domestic workers within their borders.84

76. Kawar, supra note 74, at 495.
77. ILO, Agenda of the International Labour Conference: Proposals for the Agenda of the
99th Session (2010) of the Conference, ¶ 54, GB.300/2/2 (Nov. 2007).
78. Id. ¶ 63.
79. C189, supra note 23, preamble.
80. Little information is available about exactly who makes up these employer groups. See
Kawar, supra note 74, at 496.
81. Id.
82. Boris, supra note 7, at 97-98.
83. Kawar, supra note 74, at 497.
84. ILO, Implementation of International Labour Standards for Domestic Workers, Aug,
2017, 1 [hereinafter Implementation of International Labour Standards]; see also Decent Work
for Domestic Workers, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-protrav/—travail/documents/genericdocument/wcms_313678.pdf (listing the countries that have taken
action on C189 as of 2013); ILO, Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms in the
Domestic Work Sector Introductory Guide (2016) at 19 (noting that 70 states have taken steps
to improve protections for domestic workers, thanks to a campaign by the International Trade
Union Confederation to push for countries to ratify C189) [hereinafter Labour Inspection and
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Thirty states successfully adopted reforms to extend labor and legal
protections to domestic workers and eighteen are considering
extending protections. 85 The remaining twenty-four countries have
signed and ratified C189. 86 Since ratification, the ILO has provided
assistance to at least sixty countries on the formation of bilateral treaties
covering domestic labor, child labor, and forced labor. 87 Noticeably
absent from the signatories list are many destination countries for
migrant domestic labor: primarily developed economies in Asia and the
Middle East. 88 None of the ‘Kafala’ countries have ratified C189. 89
1. Successes of C189
C189 formally recognizes the rights of domestic workers for the
first time. It includes comprehensive obligations spanning economic,
social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. 90 Bringing
domestic workers into the ILO’s tripartite system benefits domestic
workers, who lack a voice in policy-making because of inequalities in
bargaining power. 91 C189 also brings domestic work within the ILO’s
Decent Work Agenda, an initiative to secure the right to decent work
Other Compliance Mechanisms]. For more on the ITUC’s 12 by 12 Campaign, see Ending Child
Labour, supra note 12, at 54.
85. See Implementation of International Labour Standards, supra note 84, at 1.
86. See Ratifications of C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUME
NT_ID:2551460 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (noting that the following countries have ratified
C189: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Guinea, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Switzerland, and Uruguay)
[https://perma.cc/4FDN-GSNF].
87. Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Achievements since the adoption of C189 2 (June
14, 2016). It is difficult to hypothesize as to the low, or slow, rate of C189 ratification as little
literature exists on the topic. It is possible that some countries lack unions or mass movements
to encourage ratification. One possibility is that ILO ratification tends to be lower in Africa and
parts of Asia, where greater portions of the economy are informal. Evance Kalula, Juliana
Masabo & Marius Oliver, Informality, Employment and Social Protection: Some Critical
Perspectives for/from Developing Countries, July 2012.
88. Including countries with large numbers of migrant domestic workers, such as the UAE
with over 750,000 migrant domestic workers and Kuwait with 620,000. See Migrant Rights
Statistics – Domestic Workers in the Gulf, Migrant Rights Org. (2018), https://www.migrantrights.org/statistic/domesticworkers/ [https://perma.cc/E2MK-RCUA].
89. The Countries using the Kafala system of migration are the UAE, Oman, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. See Migrant Forum Asia, supra note 66.
90. See generally C189, supra note 23.
91. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note, at 40.

1352 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:5

for all workers. 92 The Decent Work Agenda involves ILO monitoring
and assessment, data collection, policy analysis, and country profiling
for compliance. 93 Article 7 of C189 requires that DWs be informed of
their work terms and conditions, preferably through written contracts.94
Thus, the Convention could move workers from the informal sector
into a formal work situation. 95 Additionally, these rights have begun to
be incorporated in other ILO instruments. 96
2. Shortcomings of C189
The definition of domestic work “within an employment
relationship” has been criticized due to the occasionally ambiguous
nature of an employment relationship. 97 The ILO defines employment
as “performing some work for wage or salary in cash or in kind.” 98 This
can be problematic in the domestic work industry where benefits are
given, but not explicitly exchanged for work. For example, a young
woman working in her aunt’s home may receive lodging or food.
Though this could be considered an ‘in kind’ benefit, her aunt could
argue that such benefits are not conditional on the working relationship,
and therefore the situation would fall outside the legal definition of an
employment relationship. Employers could thus abuse this definition

92. Tomei, supra note 24, at 186-87.
93. See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG - MEASURING DECENT WORK, http://www.ilo.org/
integration/themes/mdw/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
94. C189, supra note 23, art. 23 VII (“Each Member shall take measures to ensure that
domestic workers are informed of their terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate,
verifiable and easily understandable manner and preferably, where possible, through written
contracts in accordance with national laws, regulations or collective agreements.”).
95. Sandra Fredman, Home from Home: Migrant Domestic Workers and the International
Labour Organization Convention on Domestic Workers, in MIGRANTS AT WORK:
IMMIGRATION AND VULNERABILITY IN LABOUR LAW 408 (Cathryn Costello & Mark Freedland
eds., 2014) (“the Convention might facilitate some movement of workers from informal and
uncertain work arrangements to a more formal situation. However, as is well known, employers
are adept at producing documents which disguise relationships to avoid regulation”).
96. For example, ILO Recommendation 204 on the Transition from the Informal to the
Informal Economy in Section 4(c) includes “paid domestic workers employed by households.”
ILO, Recommendation 204 – Recommendation Concerning the Transition from the Informal to
the Formal Economy §4(c), June 12, 2015.
97. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 145 (noting that the definition “within an employment
relationship” excludes those employed on a casual basis).
98. Glossary of Statistical Terms, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (2018), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=778 [https://perma.cc/3K289ZEU].
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to conceal employment relationships. 99 Additionally, C189’s definition
excludes those not in an employment relationship, 100 which effectively
excludes DWs working for agencies, who are self-employed, or work
on a casual basis. 101
C189 uses primarily non-binding language. For example, Article
9 states that domestic workers are ‘free to reach an agreement’ with
their employers on whether to reside in the home. 102 This falls short of
asserting that a DW has the right to live away from the place of
employment. Employers cannot be held directly accountable under
C189. While C189 requires that States shall provide enforcement
mechanisms against abusive employment agencies, it makes no
mention of what these may look like. 103 Agencies commit a variety of
abuses against migrant domestic workers, including confiscation of
travel documents and wages. 104 C189 requires simply that States
provide penalties for abusive agencies. 105 It does not demand that
signatories make changes to how employers or agencies are held
accountable. 106
3. Recommendation 201
While C189 is a binding document, R201 is an accompanying and
non-binding recommendation that further clarifies the nature of the
99. Maggie Black, Child Domestic Workers: a handbook on good practice in programme
interventions, Anti-Slavery International, 59 (2005). Anti-Slavery International points out that
distinctions must be drawn between ‘fostering’ children and ‘adopting’ them, the latter of which
would require equal treatment with the household’s other children. The lack of a legal distinction
could amount to a family member being treated as labor, without payment.
100. See C189, supra note 23, art. 3(3).
101. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 145.
102. See C189, supra note 23, art 9.
103. See C189, supra note 23.
104. See Elizabeth Frantz, Breaking the Isolation: Access to Information and Media
Among Migrant Domestic Workers in Jordan and Lebanon 4, Open Society Foundations, (Feb.
23, 2014) (“Recruitment agencies and employers routinely confiscate the passports of
migrants”); see also Peggy W.Y. Lee & Carole J. Petersen, Forced Labour and Debt Bondage
in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers, at 15, 27
(“Agencies routinely charge six months wages, arranging with the employer to divert to them
the helper’s wages . . . When an employment agent or employer confiscates the passport of a
MDW, it gains an element of control and ownership that can turn an abusive employment
situation into a form of slavery.”).
105. See C189, supra note 23, art. 15(1)(c).
106. See C189, art. 15 (requiring only that governments oversee agencies by providing
complaint mechanisms, criminalize abuse of domestic workers by agencies, and ensure that
agency fees are not directly deducted from a DW’s remuneration).
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rights detailed in C189. 107 C189 and R201 are designed to be read
together, as the latter expands upon the provisions of the Convention.108
R201 requires states to identify the worst forms of child domestic labor
and pay special attention to the needs of domestic workers under the
age of 18. 109
B.

The Eradication of Child Labor

The application of human rights to children is a relatively recent
concept. 110 The eradication of the worst forms of child labor has been
addressed in international conventions and declarations, particularly
ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Child. 111 Domestic work has been
linked with widely-disparaged labor practices including human
trafficking and the worst forms of child labor. 112 The nearly universal
ratification of these treaties provides a strong base for greater
legislative protection of domestic workers, as opposed to other
prominent human rights conventions.
1. Convention 182
C182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour is one of the most
widely-ratified ILO conventions, with 180 ratifications. 113 C182 uses
binding language requiring that State parties “shall take immediate and
effective measures” to fulfill its mandate. 114 Given the high ratification
rate of C182, countries have affirmative obligations to protect child
workers that fall under its mandate. C182 calls on governments to

107. ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Convention 189 & Recommendation 201
at a Glance, Int’l Labour Office of Geneva 7 (2011) [hereinafter R201].
108. Id.
109. ILO, Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Art 5(1)-(2),
15B/2, PR No. 15B (June 16, 2011).
110. ILO, Tackling Child Labour in Domestic Work: A Handbook for Action, Int’l Labour
Org. & Int’l Domestic Workers Fed’n., 68 (2017) [hereinafter Tackling Child Labour].
111. See C182, supra note 12; UNCRC, supra note 10.
112. See Paul Vitello, From Stand in Long Island Slavery Case, a Snapshot of a Hidden
U.S. Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2007); see also Human Rights Watch, Protect 15 Million
Child Domestic Workers (Feb. 25, 2013).
113. Ratifications of C182, supra note 12.
114. C182, supra note 12, art. I.
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prioritize the abolition of the worst forms of child labor in their
attempts to eradicate child labor completely. 115
Domestic legislation regulating the employment of children often
exists on the books, but domestic work may be excluded. 116 In the mid2000s a number of major human rights organizations published studies
on the intersection between the worst forms of child labor and domestic
work. Human Rights Watch produced a report in 2006 titled “Swept
under the Rug: Abuses against Domestic Workers Around the World,”
which found that laws prohibiting abusive child domestic labor were
poorly enforced. 117 Anti-Slavery International also conducted research
on domestic workers in the Middle East in the same year and found that
girls as young as five were doing domestic work. 118 In 2005, AntiSlavery International listed practices through which domestic work
could contribute to the worst forms of child labor, in contravention of
C182 and its accompanying Recommendation 190.119 These include
circumstances in which a child is helping pay off a parent’s debt, when
a child is under fourteen-years-old, or when a child is forced to work
excessive hours. 120
Article 3 of C189 clearly lists one of its goals as the effective
abolition of child labor. 121 C189 complements some provisions in C138
on Minimum Age and C182, for example Article 4 of C189 requires a
minimum age be set for domestic work consistent with those
Conventions. 122 R201 also requires the identification, prohibition and
elimination of hazardous domestic work by children, and
implementation of monitoring systems to prevent this. 123
Article 7 (2) of C182 requires a ratifying state to take effective
measures to prevent child labor by providing direct assistance for
removal of children from the worst forms of child labor, ensuring
115. The complete eradication of child labor is called for in Convention 138. ILO,
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, preamble (June 19, 1976).
116. Black, supra note 99, at 59.
117. Human Rights Watch, Swept Under the Rug, Vol. 18, Number 7(C) (2006).
118. Anti-Slavery International, Trafficking in Women Forced Labour and Domestic Work
in the Context of the Middle East and Gulf Region, at 18-19 (2006); see also Celia Mather,
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing, [WIEGO] “Yes, We Did It!”
How the World’s Domestic Workers Won Their International Rights and Recognition (2000).
119. Black, supra note 99, at 6.
120. Id.
121. C189, supra note 23, art. 3(2)(c).
122. Id. art. 4.
123. R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2).
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access to basic education, identifying and reaching out to children at
special risk and taking “into account the special situation of girls”.124
Therefore, where children are found at particular risk in domestic work,
C182 requires states to take effective measures to identify and reach
out to them. 125 Because of the high prevalence of girls in the industry,
states are further required to take into account the role of females in
domestic work. 126
2. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The UN Convention on the Rights of Child is a binding document
with 196 parties. 127 Only the United States has not ratified the
agreement, though it has signed it. 128 Though many provisions of
UNCRC are applicable to child domestic workers (“CDWs”), 129
UNCRC Article 32 in particular prohibits work that is hazardous,
interferes with education or is otherwise harmful to the child’s health
or mental, moral or social development. 130 Article 32 also requires
governments to undertake administrative, legislative and social
measures to ensure appropriate hours and conditions for
employment. 131 This includes penalties or sanctions for those found to
124. C182, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(a)-(e).
125. Id. art. (7)(d).
126. Id. art. (7)(e).
127. UNCRC, supra note 10.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Rights relevant to child domestic workers in the UNCRC include: The right to nondiscrimination, on grounds of ethnic or social origin, birth or other status (Article 2); The right
to be cared for by his or her parents (Article 7); The right to preserve identity, nationality, name
and family relations (Article 8); The right to maintain regular contact with parents if separated
from them (Article 9); The right not to be illicitly transferred abroad (Article 11); The right to
express views in all matters affecting her/himself (Article 12); The right to freedom of
association (Article 15); The right to be brought up by parents or guardians whose basic concern
is his or her best interests (Article 18); The right to protection from physical or mental illtreatment, neglect or exploitation (Article 19); The right to benefit from the highest attainable
standard of health and access to health care services (Article 24); The right to social security,
including social insurance in accordance with national law (Article 26); The right to conditions
of living necessary for his or her development (Article 27); The right to education (Article 28);
The right to rest, leisure, play and recreation (Article 31); The right to protection from all forms
of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (Article 34); The right to protection from abduction, sale
or trafficking (Article 35); and The right to protection from cruel or degrading treatment, and
arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Article 37). ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note
57, at 26.
130. UNCRC, supra note 10, art. 32(1).
131. Id. art. 32(2).
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violate the article. 132 A possible penalty could be the criminalization of
private conduct that breaches this Article. UNCRC further prohibits
prejudicial exploitation of any sort. 133
IV. ‘LEGISLATIVE PRECARIOUSNESS’ - HISTORICAL
SHORTCOMINGS OF DESTINATION COUNTRY LEGISLATION
The nature of domestic work as described in Part II creates
‘legislative precariousness’, or the particular vulnerability created by
explicit exclusion or a lesser degree of protection in protective labor
laws. 134 Part IV highlights a number of areas in which domestic work
legislation has been difficult to implement. This Part then addresses the
challenges jurisdictions face when balancing the rights of domestic
workers versus those of their employers to create a foundation for using
a rights-based framework to analyze the balance of rights.
Domestic work has been described as work ‘like no other’ that
should be treated as any other. 135 However, legislators often see
domestic work as deserving of different treatment. 136 This leads to
legislative precariousness created either by explicit exclusions of
domestic workers from legislation, or through lower standards of
protection. 137 The most precarious group of domestic workers are
undocumented migrants who, due to their irregular immigration status,
are less likely than workers with immigration documents to challenge
abusive employment practices. 138
Exemptions from minimum wage and maximum working hour
legislation render domestic workers without a grounds for complaint
when employers increase working hours or withhold wages. 139 Nearly
half of the countries surveyed by the ILO exclude domestic workers
from working time legislation, and eighty-three percent of these
countries did not impose any limit on night time work. 140 Even
132. Id. art. 32(2)(c).
133. Id. art. 36.
134. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 133.
135. Smith, supra note 4.
136. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 133.
137. See id. at 136; see also Ratifications of C182, supra note 10 (discussing disparate
application of legislation to domestic workers).
138. See THE RIGHT TO WORK, supra note 62, at 51.
139. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra 84, at 55 (noting
that complaint mechanisms help domestic workers enforce their rights).
140. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 11.
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developed economies, including the United Kingdom, United States,
Canada, Finland, Japan, Greece, and Switzerland, exclude domestic
workers from minimum wage legislation. 141 Additional variables that
cause the employment relationship to be precarious include labor
market security, degree of legal protection, income, social factors such
as gender or race, and relative control over employment contract terms
such as duration and working conditions. 142 Where standards exist, lack
of government oversight causes legislative precariousness. 143
A.

Challenges in Legislation

Exclusion of domestic workers from legal protection under
domestic law is widespread. This exclusion systematically limits DWs’
rights and labor protections and denies them effective access to
justice. 144 In 2013, the ILO estimated that 29.9 percent of all domestic
workers are completely excluded from the scope of national labor
legislation. 145 Only ten percent have full coverage. 146 Associations of
domestic workers often lack the necessary political or social clout to
effect change. This can be exacerbated by continued supply of domestic
workers from poor, rural communities as rights-asserting workers are
pushed out for ignorant ones. 147 This Part highlights the particular
challenges in regulating the domestic work industry: abolishing the
practices that lead to forced labor, promoting occupational health and
141. Mantouvalou, supra note 56, at 5.
142. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 135.
143. For example in the areas of labor inspections or health and safety regulations see
supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor,
supra note 4, at 140.
144. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 11; see also ILO, Giving Globalization a
Human Face – General Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights at Work in
Light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization, 101st Session, 2012.
145. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 51.
146. Id.
147. BSAF, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that the preferred age of a domestic worker in
Bangladesh is eight to fifteen years old because such a worker complains less, and is controlled
and trained more easily than older workers). See also Bede Sheppard, Human Rights Watch,
Workers in the Shadows: Abuse and Exploitation of Child Domestic Workers in Indonesia 39
(Feb. 2009) (noting that the motivation of someone recruiting a child rather than an adult for
domestic worker is that the former complains less, is easier to control, and has few social
connections upon which to rely for help); Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 53
(“employers hire children because they are ‘cheaper’ than their adult counterparts. They can be
dismissed easily if labour demands fluctuate. They also form a docile, obedient workforce that
is easier to exploit and will not seek to organize itself for protection and support.”).
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safety, ensuring trade union participation, and ensuring access to
justice.
1. Forced Labor
Forced labor occurs when an individual is coerced to work
through menace of penalty. 148 Forced labor can also incorporate more
subtle means such as abuses of debt, retention of identity documents or
threats by employers of denunciation to immigration authorities.149
Forced labor in domestic work can occur due to poor labor standards,
including lack of formal work contracts, undefined working hours,
poor living accommodations and limits on social freedom during
periods of rest. 150 One remedy is to count work and on-call hours for
the purposes of minimum wage and maximum working hour
legislation. 151 Article 10 of C189 requires that on-call working hours
be regarded as hours of work, but only to the extent determined by
national laws. 152 R201 adopts more explicit protection, and suggests
that members regulate the maximum number of hours in a given period
that a DW may be required to be on standby. 153 However, these actions
require employers be willing and able to document working hours.

148. ILO, Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), art. 2(1) (May 1, 1932).
149. ILO, Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203),
(June 11, 2014) (noting that forced labour can be addressed by preventing debt bondage, working
with employers and immigration authorities).
150. PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 18, (“Vulnerability to exploitation abroad is often
heightened by routine violations committed in Nepal during the pre-departure phase by
individual agents, recruitment agencies, and other private actors. These include misrepresenting
the nature and terms of work available, overcharging on recruitment fees, delaying or cancelling
departures, and failing to provide workers with correct pre-departure documents, including
receipts and contracts of employment and recruitment. These abuses persist due to a lack of
transparency, government oversight, and accountability in the private recruitment and placement
of migrant workers—which also undermine workers’ ability to access justice for these harms.”);
see also Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, supra note 15, at 155 (“Prevention measures could include
actions to reduce the vulnerability of groups at particular risk of forced labour. In the case of
migrant workers, these measures could include improving recruitment systems, monitoring
recruitment agencies, strengthening the legislative framework and providing more training.”).
151. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 61 (“These require, among other things, the
adoption of strict limits to their working hours, prohibition of night work, and the need to
establish mechanisms to monitor their working and living conditions.”).
152. C189, supra note 23, art. 10.
153. R201, supra note 107, art. 9(1)(a).
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2. Occupational Safety and Health
Domestic workers are vulnerable to particular occupational health
and safety standards including limited rest, exposure to chemicals,
physical pains due to heavy lifting, and increased risk of sexual and
physical violence. 154 Long working hours, repetitive motions, and
monotonous or repetitive task can cause physical strain on workers’
bodies. 155 Despite this, the ILO estimates that around ninety percent of
domestic workers do not have social security coverage that would
facilitate equal access to programs that would ensure an accident does
not render them without protection, a fundamental human right. 156
Concerns with health and access to social security are addressed
in Article 13 of C189 on the right to a safe and healthy working
environment, with a caveat for progressive realization of this right.157
However, conducting on-site workplace visits to employers’ homes for
health and safety continues to be a problematic area in domestic
work. 158 Further, C189 suggests only that DWs negotiate with their
employer whether or not to reside in the employer’s home. 159 Requiring
that domestic workers live with their employers has been affirmatively
linked with abusive labor practices. 160 However, many jurisdictions are

154. ILO, Migrant Domestic Workers: Promoting Occupational Safety and Health, 1
(2016) (“The ILO recognizes that domestic workers can be particularly vulnerable to certain
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) risks including working long hours, limited rest,
exposure to chemicals, lifting heavy weights, specific psychosocial risks and violence”).
155. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 26; Ending Child Labour,
supra note 12, at 33.
156. ILO, Social Protection for Domestic Workers: Key policy trends and statistics, ix
(“Due to the atypical characteristics of domestic work, workers are considered a “difficult-tocover” group by social security; it is estimated that globally 90 per cent of domestic workers are
legally excluded from social security systems”). Access to social security is a fundamental
human right, enumerated in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
157. C189, supra note 23, art. 13.
158. See infra IV.B(1) on employer’s privacy.
159. C189, supra note 23, art. 9; see infra IV.B(2) on employee’s privacy rights.
160. Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11, at 22-23 (listing the
international bodies that have expressed concern over Hong Kong’s live-in requirement, and
noting: “MDWs are particularly vulnerable to excessive working hours given the nature of the
work and “live-in” arrangements, where work and rest boundaries may be blurred”); see also
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China
with respect to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ¶ 20, Advance Unedited Version,
Un Doc.: CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 (Dec. 2015) (noting that Hong Kong should allow workers
to ‘live-out’ to prevent torture and ill-treatment).
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resistant to even permit migrant domestic workers the option of ‘livingout.’ 161
C189 places an affirmative obligation on countries to develop and
implement measures for labor inspection, including specifications
under which access to household premises may be granted. 162 R201
further states that members should take steps to provide an adequate
system of household inspection, and should consider implementing a
system of household visits where labor inspectors are allowed to enter
the premises. 163
3. Trade Union Participation
Trade union representation and participation of domestic workers
is notoriously difficult. 164 It is particularly challenging to disseminate
information to individuals working in private homes – particularly
where domestic workers do not have days off from work. 165 In some
cases, domestic workers are legislatively excluded altogether from
union activity, which can limit their interactions and informational
exchange with similarly situated domestic workers. 166
Workers in any industry can be vulnerable to dismissal or other
poor treatment for union participation, particularly migrants. 167 R201
encourages governments to consult “with the most representative
organizations of employers and workers, and where they exist, with
organizations representative of domestic workers and those
representative of employers of domestic workers.” 168 R201 thus
161. For example, in Hong Kong there is some speculation that the government is
concerned that loosened restrictions on migrant workers living conditions will allow them to
claim abode, and thus obtain the right to vote. For a case challenging Hong Kong’s right to abode
laws, see Vallejos Evangeline Banao v. Comm’r of Registration & Another, [2012] 2 H.K.C.
185 (H.K.C.F.A.R.); For commentary on the same, See generally Two Pinoys in Hong Kong
abode cases ordered to pay court costs, GMA NEWS NETWORK, July 16, 2013; see also HK High
Court Overturns Immigration’s Decision On OFW, PHILIPPINE DAILY MIRROR, Oct 4, 2011.
162. C189, supra note 23, art. 17.
163. R201, supra note 107, art. 19(b).
164. Fredman, supra note 94, at 410.
165. Asha D’Souza, Int’l Labour Org., Moving Towards Decent Work for Domestic
Workers: An Overview of the ILO’s Work, 23, 73, 81, (working Paper 2/2010 2010), supra note
29.
166. Mantouvalou, supra note 56, at 6; see also The Kafala, supra note 65, at 52 (noting
that Oman and Qatar prohibit MDWs from joining trade unions).
167. Id. at 50 (noting that migrant workers in Bahrain fear deportation if they join unions).
168. R201, supra note 107, art. 13(2).

1362 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:5

distinguishes between general unions and those representing domestic
workers in particular. This distinction highlights a particular challenge:
some general trade unions may have a conflict of interest between
domestic workers and their members, who may employ domestic
workers. 169 Permitting workers to form their own unions must be
accompanied by requirements that they be legislatively granted
mandatory leave in order to have time to undertake union activities.
This means that domestic workers must not be excluded from
mandatory leave legislation. The formation of unions also relies on a
democratic government that is receptive to union activity.
4. Access to Justice
Due to low levels of education or language skills among domestic
workers and lack of knowledge about their rights, DWs often have
difficulties accessing justice for labor and other violations committed
against them. The previously enumerated difficulties in protecting
domestic workers from forced labor, health hazards and dismissal also
culminate to create difficulties in accessing justice. 170 Article 15(b) of
C189 calls for governments to ensure adequate procedures exist for
investigating complaints and encourages bilateral, regional, or
multilateral agreements to prevent abuses of MDWs and fraudulent
practices. 171 Solutions suggested by R201 include a national hotline
with interpretation services and emergency housing. 172 However, even
the government employees of origin countries may not be well-trained
or sympathetic to the particular needs of migrant domestic workers.173
C189 suggests that origin countries inform migrant workers of their
rights before departure, establish legal assistance funds, and supply
social services and specialized consular services. 174
169. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 23.
170. Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 155. (listing threat of deportation,
limited mobility, and financial and communication barriers as hindrances to accessing legal
justice); PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 145-55 (noting that MDWs do not access justice
due to lack of awareness about rights, lack of evidence to support claims, fear of retaliation,
perceptions of corruption, lack of regulation, and socio-political, economic or gender related
obstacles).
171. C189, supra note 23, art. 15(b).
172. R201, supra note 107, art. 21(1)(a)-(c).
173. Sarah Paoletti, Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Nepal, Open Soc. Foun.
1, 152 (2014).
174. R201, supra note 107, art. 21(2).
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Favoring the Powerful: Balancing Rights

Consideration must be given as to which rights are implicated in
the oversight of the DW industry to draw a proper balance between the
rights of employers and domestic workers. Human rights documents
such as UNCRC, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights require that
States grant equal human rights to individuals without
discrimination. 175 Respecting the privacy rights of employers while
failing to respect those of domestic workers would constitute a breach
this equal protection. 176 It is an outdated idea that only certain types of
people are deserving of rights. In the United States, a historical
understanding of a man’s possessions extended to his family, his
effects, and those who labored for him. 177 This led care workers to be
conflated with servants, who were part of an ‘estate’, and therefore
confined to private life. 178 The focus of legislators was primarily on the
recipient of the care, rather than the giver, therefore “care as a labor of
love . . . became a rationale to ignore the conditions of care as
employment.” 179
The perception that domestic work should remain in the private
domain persists today. 180 Destination countries often tacitly (or even
explicitly) refuse to acknowledge DWs as part of the formal labor
force. 181 In drafting exclusion statutes, states have occasionally used
demeaning or outdated language, such as references to domestic
workers as ‘menial or domestic servants’ 182 or as domestic ‘helpers’.183
175. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1
U.N.T.S. 4.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Boris, supra note 7, at 3.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 9.
180. The Editors, Will Labor Reforms in the UAE Improve Life for Migrant Domestic
Workers?, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
trend-lines/21968/will-labor-reforms-in-the-uae-improve-life-for-migrant-domestic-workers
[https://perma.cc/BY4F-UM75].
181. Survey Results of 2016 Annual Earnings and Hours Survey release, GOVERNMENT
OF HONG KONG CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT
(Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/press_release/pressReleaseDetail.jsp?pressRID=4165&charsetID=
1 [https://perma.cc/AN5X-9PF6].
182. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 70.
183. Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, H. K. Special Admin. Region, Oct. 2015,
http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B71510FA2015XXXXB0100.pdf.
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The United States’ exclusion of in-home care workers from the Fair
Labor Standards Act left them un-eligible for old age insurance,
unemployment, collective bargaining, minimum wage, maximum hour
legislation, and other labor laws. 184
1. Employer’s Privacy
Both C189 and R201 recognize the importance of employers’
privacy rights. 185 At the same time, both documents require labor
inspections to ensure occupational health and safety. 186 The ILO’s
Committee of Experts has observed that by choosing to make the
household a workplace, employers have implicitly consented to giving
up some privacy rights. 187 Many countries have begun to adapt to the
requirement of workplace inspections for domestic workers. 188
The private nature of the home means governments face more
hurdles than in other industries to ensure that a DWs’ working
conditions meet legal standards. 189 Domestic workers have little
political leverage to encourage government inspections. 190 It is also
next to impossible to observe a domestic worker at work in the same
way one would observe a factory worker, as it would be quite easy for
an employer to ensure that the domestic worker says the right things
and behaves the right way during an inspection, even where that does
not accurately reflect her lived experience. The fact that inspections of
private homes must be announced adds another layer of possible
obscurity as employers would have time to adjust any shortcomings in
living or working conditions. 191
However, a functioning labor inspection system is required to
ensure rule of law. 192 The European Committee on Social Rights
(“ECSR”) recognized the value of labor inspections in private homes,
184. For discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the context of exclusion of domestic
workers, see Boris, supra note 7, at 5.
185. C189, supra note 23, art. 17(32) (noting that States shall specify the conditions under
which access to the home can be granted, having due respect for privacy); R201, supra note 109,
art. 24 (allowing labor inspectors considering respect for privacy).
186. C189, supra note 23, art. 13.
187. Kawar, supra note 74, at 8. See also ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at 18.
188. Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 18.
189. Id. at 20-21.
190. Id. at 18-19.
191. Id. at 20, 32.
192. Id. at 28.
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reading Article 3, Section 2 of the European Social Charter as
authorizing inspectors to check all workplaces, including residential
premises. 193 The Social Charter noted that labor inspections are
particularly important to protect the health and safety rights of domestic
and home care workers. 194 Many EU countries recognized that the
privacy interests of the employer do not necessarily outweigh domestic
workers’ labor rights and authorize home visits. 195
An ILO Report from 2010 suggests that inspectors can obtain
prior authorization from a judicial authority or through the consent of
the employer. 196 Alternatively in Uruguay, workers from the Ministry
of Labour and Social Security are able to visit the domestic worker and
interview her at the front door of the home, thereby alleviating any
concerns about unannounced visits into the home. 197 Meanwhile, Some
labor unions are taking on the role of conducting home visits. In Kenya,
the Union of Domestic, Hotels, Educational Institutions, Hospitals and
Allied Workers has conducted thousands of such visits in five cities.198
2. Domestic Worker’s Rights
Some associations of employers of domestic workers did not
support the development of a convention for standard setting for
domestic workers, 199 and in some jurisdictions employers remain
hostile to improved legal protection for domestic workers.200
193. Eur Soc. Charter, Conclusions XCI-2, Czech Republic, art. 3 (“[F]or the purposes of
Article 3 § 2, inspectors must be authorized to check all workplaces. It takes workplaces to
equally include residential premises.”).
194. Id.
195. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 17, 32
(noting that in many EU countries, most labor inspectorates cover the domestic work sector).
196. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 249.
197. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 14.
198. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 19.
199. Kawar, supra note 74, at, 496 (“employer delegates remained adamantly opposed to
any additional exercises in standard-setting”). For opposition in the United States, see Boris &
Klein, CARING FOR AMERICA, supra note 44, at 132 (stating that well-organized trade
associations and business interest groups had long opposed minimum wage and New Deal
programs).
200. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 18 (noting that 48% of employers in India, Thailand, Italy
and Sweden do not think that a domestic worker is entitled to a contract, 70% said they should
not have the right to join a trade union, 52% were opposed to a minimum wage and 45% said
that fixed working hours should not apply); In Hong Kong, ‘employer’s groups’ have petitioned
the government to give them greater control over the migrant domestic worker’s rights,
including withholding of passports, see Tom Grundy & Meredith McBride, Top 10 Most
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Destination countries of domestic migrant labor have little incentive to
improve protections for workers who hold little social or political clout
– particularly where supply of domestic work is greater than
demand. 201 Further, some employers act as though food and
accommodation are benefits, when in reality “living-in” is a price being
paid by domestic workers in terms of isolation and lack of
companionship. 202 Where DWs reside with their employers, their
ability to leave the premises, host guests, or enjoy leisure time may be
severely limited. 203 C189 requires that DWs be given at least twentyfour hours of leave per week. 204 There are concerns that standard
setting in domestic work would require elderly employers who require
around the clock care to comply with the same labor standards as
corporations, though this concern appears inflated. 205
On living conditions, C189 requires only decent living conditions
that respect privacy. 206 Neither C189 nor R201 define privacy. While
some countries fail to define adequate privacy in domestic legislation,
South Africa does regulate basic privacy for live-in domestic workers.
There, DWs can agree to live-in in exchange for a fee of no more than
ten percent of their wages. 207 DWs are legislatively required to be given
a separate room with one window and a door that locks. 208 This is a
vast improvement over the reality of many domestic workers. 209
DWs are sometimes exempt from protective legislation even
where labor laws may protect their employers. The need to present
labor rights as human rights comes not just from a desire for greater
dignity, but also “from the perceived need to respond to employers’
Outrageous Claims, Myths & Demands Heard at Last Week’s Gov’t Meeting, HONG KONG
HELPERS CAMPAIGN (Mar. 4, 2014); see also Stanley Leung, ‘Heartbroken’: Domestic worker
employer group decries window cleaning ban, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Oct. 20, 2016).
201. PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 26.
202. R201, supra note 107, art. 14. See Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 77.
203. For more on examples of restrictions placed on domestic workers by their employers,
see Grundy supra note 34.
204. C189, supra note 23, art. 10(2).
205. Albin & Mantouvalou, supra note 6, at 77 (highlighting comments from a Ms.
Warwick in the International Labour Conference Record of Proceedings on June 5, 2011).
206. C189, supra note 23, art. VI.
207. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 §8(a)-(b) (S. Afr.); see also
LABOUR DEP’T OF S. AFRICA, Domestic Workers What You Should Know, at 13 (2012).
208. In addition, the room must be weatherproof and in good condition, and have access
to a bathroom. What You Should Know, supra note 207, at 13.
209. Gabby Bess, Hong Kong Domestic Workers are Forced to Sleep in Cabinets: Report,
VICE (May 24, 2017).
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willingness to use these arguments and tools themselves.” 210 Because
human rights apply to individuals without discrimination, both
employers and domestic workers should enjoy the right to privacy in
their living space. It is not in keeping with equality to grant the right of
privacy to the employer, while failing to ensure that a live-in domestic
worker has adequate privacy through labor inspections. 211 It is ironic
that some DWs, with few legal protections and low wages, facilitate
the ability of their employers to enter the labor force, where the
employers may already have adequate legal protections. Yet, some
employers would deny DWs these same rights.
V. CONNECTING DOMESTIC WORK AND CHILD LABOR
This Part first considers the differences between child and adult
DWs, particularly in regard to their legal ability to consent to
potentially hazardous work. Despite these difference, adult and child
DWs exhibit similar indicators of labor trafficking. 212 This suggests
that the nature of the industry creates opportunities for abuse. A 2006
joint ILO and International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (“IPEC”) report on trade unions and child labor indicates that
child labor could be eradicated by improving labor conditions and
economic opportunities for adults, who often send their own children
to work due to the cycle of poverty. 213 This Note posits that the opposite
is true as well: improving working conditions for children engaged in
domestic work would not only empower them when they become
adults in the industry, but would also improve working conditions for
adult domestic workers. Workers and advocates could thus prevent a

210. Virginia Mantouvalou, Are Labour Rights Human Rights?, citing C. Fenwick and T.
Novitz, Conclusion: Regulating to Protect Workers’ Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT
WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 587-88 (C. Fenwick and T. Novitz eds.
2010).
211. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 160.
212. ILO, Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings. Results from Delphi
Survey Implemented by the ILO and the European Commission (2009) [hereinafter Delphi
indicators].
213. Markie M., Production, Reproduction, and Feminism, J. MEDIA, 2017,
https://journal.media/production-reproduction-and-feminism [https://perma.cc/WA6H-5HCM].
See also Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 59 (“Bringing about improved working
conditions for adults should result in a corresponding decline in the incidence of child labour
and growth in the number of children enrolling and remaining in school.”).
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‘race-to-the-bottom’ where employers favor younger, less expensive
(and less assertive) workers. 214
Though the public and media are generally responsive to, and
often outraged by 215 reports of child labor and abuse, including in the
area of domestic work, the outcry has not always been the same for
adult DWs. Of those domestic worker abuse stories that have received
international public attention in English media, many are young and
female. 216 The ILO estimates that 17.2 million children worldwide are
engaged in paid or unpaid domestic work in the home of another
person. 217 Of these 17.2 million children, 11.5 million are female.218
Further, domestic work can often be a precursor to sexual
exploitation. 219
While governments are willing to take steps to protect children
from abusive labor, it is not clear they are equally interested in

214. Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that the preferred age of a domestic
worker in Bangladesh is eight to fifteen years old and, further, that such a worker who complains
less, is controlled and trained more easily than an older worker); see also Sheppard, Workers in
the Shadows, supra note 147, at 39 (noting that the motivation of someone recruiting a child
rather than an adult for domestic work is that the former complains less, is easier to control, and
has few social connections upon which to rely for help).
215. See John H. Cushman Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. Rules
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/
international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-child-labor-and-apply-us-rules-abroad.html
[https://perma.cc/8BAW-FUJB]; see also Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect;
Looking Behind Those Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996,
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/business/a-sweetheart-becomes-suspect-looking-behindthose-kathie-lee-labels.html [https://perma.cc/35D4-Y63U]; Tim Worstall, The Outrage Of
Child Labor In Bangladesh’s Sweatshops, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2016/12/19/the-outrage-of-child-labour-in-bangladeshs-sweatshops/
[https://perma.cc/U82S-8TPF].
216. See generally Michael Forsythe, Hong Kong Worker Wins Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/asia/hong-kong-court-convictsemployer-in-abuse-of-domestic-worker.html [https://perma.cc/AD6P-D3P4]; Couple Jailed for
Starving Maid: Previous Maid Abuse Cases in Singapore, STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 28, 2017,
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/couple-jailed-for-starving-maidprevious-maid-abuse-cases-in-singapore [https://perma.cc/7KY9-63NC]; Annie Kelly & Hazel
Thompson, The vanished: the Filipino domestic workers who disappear behind closed doors,
THE GUARDIAN, Oct 24, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/oct/24/
the-vanished-filipino-domestic-workers-working-abroad [https://perma.cc/A5WQ-K9AA].
217. ILo, Child Domestic Work: Global Estimates 2012, 2 (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_23235/lang--en/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/GC4W-UDAG].
218. Id.
219. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 36.
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protecting adult domestic workers. 220 The age of majority in most
countries is eighteen, though many countries permit domestic labor to
be undertaken by individuals over the age of fifteen or sixteen. 221 In
many jurisdictions, eighteen is the age at which individuals are held
responsible for their decisions to undertake work or migrate for labor,
and therefore are accepting the risks inherent in that role. 222
While recognizing that line-drawing legislation around age is
necessary given children’s unique protections under ILO and UN
mechanisms, to give effect to these international agreements requires
countries to affirmatively adopt protections and mechanisms to aid
CDWs to leave abusive situations. 223 These international conventions
do not ban all forms of child labor. 224 Rather, they focus on the most
exploitative types. 225 It follows then that these conventions and their
signatories find appalling not simply that children work, but that they
are subject to coercive and abusive forms of labor. Age is just one of
many factors that would be considered in determining whether a
worker is in a coercive form of labor. 226 The age of a DW is not the
ultimate factor for determining whether abuse has occurred. Rather,
states look at whether specific coercive factors have deprived a DW of
a means of changing their situation. 227 These coercive factors include
the worker’s dependency on the employer, social isolation, lack of
alternative living or working arrangements, abusive working hours,
high risk of abuse, and lack of support mechanisms such as social
security or legal aid. 228 A compilation of these factors ultimately

220. See supra Part III.A.
221. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 19.
222. R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2) (noting that special attention should be given to
domestic workers under the age of 18); see also Determining the Legal Age to Consent to
Research, University of Washington St. Louis, https://hrpo.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
01/5-Determining-Legal-Age-to-Consent.pdf.
223. See supra Part III.B.
224. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 14-24.
225. Id. at 14-25.
226. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212; see also infra Part IV.B.
227. The eight Delphi Indicators of trafficking of children for labour exploitation are the
same eight factors for trafficking of adults for labour exploitation, with the exception that ‘no
access to education’ is given less weight for adults than it is for children. Similarly, adult and
child workers share the same seven indicators of abuse of vulnerability at destination, with the
exception that two are considered ‘weak indicators’ for adults and ‘medium indicators’ for
children. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212.
228. See infra Part V.B.
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deprives a DW of the ability to choose to leave an abusive situation,
rendering them in a form of exploitative labor.
Ascertaining the age of workers can be difficult. Many of the rural
communities in developing economies from which domestic workers
come do not provide ID documents at birth, making it difficult to
confirm an individual’s age. 229 Some employment agencies will lie
about a worker’s age to secure her placement abroad. 230 Anti-Slavery
International noted a ‘step-migration’ where children in Peru and the
Philippines work outside major cities, closer to their rural homes, and
then migrate towards larger urban areas as they became older.
Therefore never require this paperwork until they go abroad. 231
Some NGOs have begun to use the overlap between exploitative
child labor and domestic work in their rights advocacy. In February
2013, Human Rights Watch called on governments to ratify C189 to
end child labor. 232 UNICEF, in 2013, used its World Day against Child
Labor to call for the ratification of C189. 233 The ILO also called for
ratification of C189 to help end child labor234 noting that child labor in
domestic work abuses children’s rights and remains a serious hurdle in
ensuring decent work for adults. 235 The ILO with the International
Domestic Workers Federation published a 2017 Best Practice Report
advocating approaches to reduce the worst forms of child labor in
domestic work in India and Nepal. 236 The ILO-IPEC report also notes
229. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 47; Voices of Child Domestic
Workers, supra note 27, at 8.
230. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 47; see also Jalelah Abu Baker,
When a Maid Lies about Her Age, ASIA ONE, (June 3, 2014), http://www.asiaone.com/
singapore/when-maid-lies-about-her-age [https://perma.cc/L2LH-LF2C]; Syliva Yu, The
Indonesian Child Maids of Hong Kong, Singapore: Why they’re Suffering in Silence, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/20818
23/indonesian-child-maids-hong-kong-singapore-why-theyre-suffering [https://perma.cc/2JER3NJJ].
231. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 33.
232. Human Rights Watch, Protect 15 Million Child Domestic Workers HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/25/protect-15-million-childdomestic-workers [https://perma.cc/99UX-F75D].
233. U.N.I.C.E.F., World Day Against Child Labour: Plight of child domestic workers,
YOUTUBE (Jun. 12, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbkAoppuUwc (last visited
Mar. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K2GF-JZLA].
234. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 53.
235. Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS BUREAU, PROMOTE:
DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS TO END CHILD DOMESTIC WORK (2012).
236. ILO, INT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS FED’N., DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS:
EIGHT GOOD PRACTICES FROM ASIA(2017).
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that adult unions have played a role as a public watchdog, monitoring
and intervening in extreme cases of child labor abuse, and that civil
society plays a crucial role in training and providing social services to
victims of abusive labor practices. 237
A.

Differences between Adult and Child DWs

Before highlighting the similar vulnerabilities between the two
groups, it is important to address the primary differences between adult
DWs and CDWs. First, one of the primary concerns with child labor is
that work will interfere in children’s ability to obtain an education – a
fundamental right of a child, and one that is not given equivalent
importance for adult workers. 238 Secondly, adult domestic workers are
legally able to give consent to undertake work that may be considered
hazardous, whereas children cannot. Finally, the employers of these
workers may be different as many children are employed by extended
family members, whereas adults may work for non-family
domestically or abroad.
The noted similarities between adult and child DWs is not meant
to conflate the two groups or in any way undermine the sophistication
or autonomy of adult domestic workers. Domestic workers are
increasingly sophisticated and organized. 239 Some child DWs have
argued for greater respect for their decisions and autonomy. 240 Rather,
this approach addresses the systemic shortcomings in industry
regulation. It is not clear that adult domestic workers, particularly
migrants, automatically consent to any working conditions simply by
virtue of their adulthood. This is particularly true when they face
unexpected and illegal abuse.
The relevant inquiry regarding abuse of DWs is thus not the age
of the domestic worker or their choice to work, but rather the
deprivation of autonomy. 241 The inability to decide when to leave a
work situation can occur where domestic workers of any age migrate
237. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 46.
238. UNCRC, supra note 10, § 28.
239. See Mather supra note 118, at 3-9.240. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra
note 27, at 3.
240. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 3.
241. Jonathan Blagbrough, Child Domestic Labour: A Modern Form of Slavery, 22
CHILD. & SOC’Y 179, 185 (Apr. 7, 2008) (“[I]t is not merely about the age of the child being too
young to work, or to choose to work; it is about being deprived of the opportunity to choose.”).
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for work. Migration, even internal, can enhance dependency on
employers. Dependency due to migration status can lead to an
employers’ failure to adhere to contract terms such as fair pay and
working hours, where they exist, which may render the workers in a
form of forced labor. 242
1. Education
Many children in domestic labor have had limited opportunities
to obtain an education. In some cases, children migrate from rural areas
to urban ones to obtain an education, earning in-kind benefits by
working in someone else’s home. 243 C189 requires that domestic
workers under eighteen not be deprived of compulsory education or
other opportunities to participate in education or vocational training.244
C182 also highlights the importance of education for children. 245 In
practice, educational opportunities may not cater to the realities of
working children. Children who migrate for work in particular, are at
high risk of exploitation, and prone to long working hours. 246 Long
working hours may prevent children from accessing their right to
education, or render them too exhausted to study. 247 The importance
given to the right of a child to obtain an education distinguishes CDWs
from their adult counterparts.
Though the lack of access to education is not as acute as for
children, adult DWs, particularly those that live with employers, may
be required to forego opportunities for additional education or skills
242. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 364 (“[D]rew specific attention to
increased vulnerability and lack of protection of migrant workers’ rights due to the high
dependency of the worker on the employer, live in requirements and employer-tied visas,
including in temporary and seasonal migration programmes.”). This is particularly true in
Middle East jurisdictions that utilize a Kafala system of sponsorship, which requires employer
approval before leaving a job, preventing migrant workers from leaving abusive employment
situations. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Alternatively, in Hong Kong, a local NGO
found that migrant workers on their first contract were 2.7 times more likely to experience
conditions of forced labor than experienced workers. Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, supra note
11, at 7.
243. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27 at 16-17; see also Ending Child
Labour, supra note 12, at 37.
244. C189, supra note 23, art. 4(2).
245. C182, supra note 114, art. 3.
246. ILO, MIGRATION AND CHILD LABOUR, http://ilo.org/ipec/areas/Migration_
and_CL/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
247. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 37-38.
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training. 248 While C189 provides an entitlement to vocational training
or education specifically for children, R201 emphasizes continuing
education for adults. 249 Preventing workers from accessing education
denies them the ability to develop the necessary skills to move out of
domestic work, if they so choose. 250
2. Consent
Perhaps the most salient difference between CDWs and adult
DWs is the notion that the latter, as adults, are assumed to understand
and consent to the risks inherent in undertaking domestic work. Adult
DWs are presumed to accept certain risks, such as the use of hazardous
household chemicals or the use of potentially dangerous household
appliances and tools such as knives, irons or propane gas tanks.251
Adult domestic workers are more equipped to handle these types of
potential household dangers than children. Adult DWs are also able to
migrate for work, and can therefore consent to debt-financed migration,
whereas children typically cannot. 252
3. Employers
A final difference between adult DWs and CDWs is that the
former are more likely to work for strangers. In some cultures, the
employer of a CDW is seen as ‘fostering’ or ‘adopting’ the child in
order to facilitate the child’s access to education or provide food and
accommodation that the child’s family cannot. 253 The relationship
between the ‘substitute parent’ and the CDW can blur the lines of the
employment relationship, and may impact their ability to obtain a

4(2).

248. This is in contravention of their Article 4 rights in C189. C189, supra note 23, art.

249. Id. See R201, supra note 107, art. 5(2)(a) (“strictly limiting their hours of work to
ensure adequate time for rest, education and training, leisure activities and family contacts”).
250. Resolution Concerning Decent Work, supra note 17, ¶ 19.
251. For a list of dangerous tasks that children are asked to undertake in domestic work
see Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 63.
252. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that a common dimension of migrant workers
is debt-financed migration).
253. In many cultures, having a young female in the home to do chores is culturally
acceptable. Anti-Slavery International supra note 99, at 4. See Swept Under the Rug, supra note
117, at 54 (noting that children often find employment with parental help).
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formal employment contract. 254 These relationships can also mask
exploitation and abuse. 255
4. Limitations of this Approach
There are limitations in utilizing a rights-based framework to
advocate for industry-wide regulation. This approach assumes that
countries have a genuine interest in eradicating child labor within their
borders. Though the UNCRC has near universal ratification, not all
countries are actively working to achieve its mandate. This may be
particularly true of small, wealthy labor destination countries. 256 Some
jurisdictions believe that child labor is almost completely eradicated
within their borders and may have little incentive to patrol the domestic
work industry for indicators of it. 257 Finally, many communities may
believe that children do not have independent rights of their own and
therefore may be socially resistant to a rights-based framework. 258
B.

Similar Risk Factors: Adult and Child DWs

Adult DWs and CDWs share many similarities aside from their
job title and demographics which make them ripe for comparison under
protective legal frameworks. These commonalities include dependency
on their employer, power inequality, social isolation, risk of low or no
pay, risk of abusive working hours, and finally the risk of emotional,
physical and sexual abuse. 259 These commonalities are not exhaustive,
254. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 27.
255. Id. at 28.
256. In 2016 Hong Kong was downgraded to a Tier-2 Watch List on the U.S. State
Department Trafficking in Persons Report. Despite labor trafficking being well-documented in
the territory, including children trafficked for sexual and domestic labor, the Hong Kong
government has expressed little interest in regulating it. Karen Cheung, Hong Kong
Downgraded to Join Ranks of Uzbekistan, Niger, Afghanistan in Annual Trafficking Report, H.
K. FREE PRESS, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/01/hong-kong-downgraded-to-joinranks-of-uzbekistan-niger-afghanistan-in-annual-trafficking-report/ [https://perma.cc/GX5NBGYT].
257. Singapore has noted that child labour is not a ‘significant’ issue, even though some
children are reported to be working in sex work in the territory. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2016
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – SINGAPORE, §7(c); see also DemandAT, supra
note 5, at 12 (noting that “child trafficking in DW has received little attention within the
European context, and there is no available data regarding the scope, even if limited, of the
issue”).
258. Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 54.
259. See supra Part II.B.
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but commonly appear in abusive domestic labor situations, and are
indicators of labor exploitation. 260 Abuses of these vulnerabilities and
exploitative conditions of work have been positively linked with
trafficking. 261 Push factors, including poverty, that cause individuals to
seek domestic work remain similar for different age groups. 262
1. Dependency on Employer & Power Inequality
Domestic workers are often dependent on their employer for
housing, food, and wages, thereby creating a significant power
inequality. 263 This power imbalance may prevent them from feeling
able to enforce their rights and leave them vulnerable to exploitation.264
In many communities, this power inequality is exacerbated by many of
the discrimination factors already noted: age, gender, class, race, and
migration status. 265 These vulnerabilities, and cultural acceptance of
inequality, can make workers more likely to put up with abusive
conditions, particularly where they and their families are dependent on
remittances. 266
Where DWs live with their employers, they are dependent on their
employer to provide adequate living facilities, health, food, and other
daily necessities. 267 CDWs may be dependent on the living
arrangement provided by an employer living in an urban area so that
they continue to access education that is not available in their home
towns. 268 Similarly, MDWs may be reliant on employers for their visa
if their immigration status is linked with employment. 269 To speak up
260. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212.
261. Id.
262. For push factors for adult migrant workers, see Trafficking in the Middle East, supra
note 15, at 45-6. For push factors for children, see Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra
note 27, at 40; see also ILO-IPEC Interregional Workshop, supra note 57, at 38.
263. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 9.
264. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 364.
265. See Smith, supra note 4.
266. Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 104 (“knowing that they will accept
these terms because they are under pressure from their families to remit badly needed money
home”); for more on remittances, see Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note
11, at 50.
267. Id. at 64 (“these range from the hours that MDWs work, to where they sleep and at
what times, what food they may eat, what to wear and many other aspects that blur the
boundaries of work/home life.”).
268. See supra Part V.A.
269. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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about poor working conditions is to risk losing gainful employment and
the living arrangements upon which they rely. This dependency can
create or exacerbate other factors: social isolation and poor living
conditions, risk of low wages, abusive working hours, and emotional,
physical or sexual abuse.
2. Social Isolation and Poor Living Conditions
Many DWs migrate long distances from a rural to urban
households. 270 Migration status, even when moving within one’s own
country, can cause vulnerabilities because migrants may lack
knowledge about local languages, resources, or laws. 271 Individuals
who live with an employer are more isolated, and therefore have
limited access to social services or resources that could help them in an
abusive situation. 272 Employers often use threats of denunciation or
reporting to authorities as common tactics to control DWs. 273 Poor
family ties, poor working conditions, lack of social support, and poor
self-reported health have been affirmatively linked with poor
psychosocial outcomes in child DWs. 274 Beyond simply emotional
isolation and lack of support networks, both adults and children may
struggle to understand occupational health and safety related
information such as labels on cleaning products that may be in another
language, heightening the risk of accidents and injuries. 275
Anti-Slavery International recommends reducing isolation and
limiting social discrimination against domestic workers. 276 Support
270. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 30.
271. Domestic Workers Across the World, supra note 6, at 44.
272. See id.; see also Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note
84, at 7, (“In some countries migrant domestic workers require their employers’ permission in
order to leave the household thereby restricting their potential to contact protection
mechanisms.”).
273. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212; see also Case of C.N. v. The United Kingdom,
App. No. 4239/08 (2013) (C.N.’s trafficker “constantly warned her that she should not talk to
people and that she could easily be arrested or otherwise come to harm.”).
274. Jennie Gamlin et al., Is Domestic Work [the] Worst Form of Child Labour? The
Findings of a Six-Country Study of the Psychosocial Effects of Child Work, Vol. 13/2 Children’s
Geographies 212, 222 (2015) (the study did not find migration itself to be a risk factor for poor
psychosocial outcomes in children, but it did note that children living at home indicated better
outcomes than those living with employers).
275. Occupational health and safety risks for the most vulnerable workers, EUR. PARL., 84
(Aug. 2011) (“This suggests that, for migrant workers, learning the language and getting
acquainted with the culture of the host society diminishes the risk of occupational incidents.”).
276. Blagbrough, supra note 241, at 187.
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groups such as unions are crucial for empowering DWs to advocate
collectively for improved working conditions. Critically, domestic
workers must have time off from work and away from employers to be
able to access such groups. 277
3. Risk of No or Little Pay
Because they often operate within the informal economy, DWs
are at risk of being paid inadequate wages below the minimum required
level or non-payment of wages. 278 The boundaries between free time,
work time, and on-call time become blurred.279 DWs also risk being
subject to deprivations of liberty and freedom of movement, such as
limitations on when they are able to take free time or excessive or
exploitative working hours. 280 The lack of a formal contract
exacerbates these risks as domestic workers may have difficulty
proving the existence of an employment relationship and may therefore
be unable to force payment through the justice system. 281 Though lack
of a contract is less likely to be an issue for migrant domestic
workers 282, they may face similar barriers in accessing the legal system,
may fall victim to fraud, or may be denied a copy of the contract. 283
Intermediaries play a crucial role in recruiting and placing
domestic workers in a home. 284 The intermediary could be a family
member or a formal agency or recruiter who will receive a fee or
percentage of a DW’s salary for recruiting the individual into domestic
work. 285 These individuals and agents can, and often do, misrepresent
277. C189 requires a day of rest, though not all countries require this. C189, supra note
23, art. 10.
278. See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 40,
(noting that “domestic workers in many countries find it difficult to negotiate wages above the
legal minimum, even where a minimum wage for domestic workers exists”).
279. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 9.
280. See Human Rights Watch, “I Was Sold”: Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant
Domestic Workers in Oman, (June 13, 2016); see also Occupational Health and Safety Risk for
the Most Vulnerable Workers, at 87-88.
281. See ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, ¶ 123.
282. This is because, by virtue of being international migrants, they will likely have one
as justification for a working visa. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶ 129.
283. See ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶¶ 131, 253.
284. See ENRICH HONG KONG ‘EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES UNCOVERED’ http://www.
enrichhk.org/2016/06/partner-blog-employment-agency-fees-uncovered/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2018) [https://perma.cc/C2ZD-X9SD].
285. Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 197.
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crucial components of working conditions such as wage, education
opportunities, and living conditions such as privacy. 286 Occasionally,
agencies or employers will confiscate passports and other crucial
identity documents, a medium indicator of forced labor. 287
4. Abusive Working Hours
Domestic workers who live with their employers are exposed to
the risk of abusive working hours. Ninety-one percent of CDWs in
India and seventy-two percent of those in Togo reported that they had
no days off in a week. 288 It was also common for these workers to report
that they worked all day without breaks. 289 Research by Anti-Slavery
International indicates that some CDWs in Lima reported that
employers sometimes tried to isolate them from their families, and in
Tanzania one-third of CDWs reported that they were not able to host
visitors. 290
Forced labor occurs when coercion is imposed on a domestic
worker to prevent them from leaving an employment situation. 291 This
can result from a variety of factors, including financial and familial
pressure to retain employment and send remittances. 292 Excessive
working hours is a strong indicator of exploitation that can impact
physical and psychosocial well-being. 293 Disturbingly, the
vulnerabilities of CDWs and MDWs in particular can be desirable to
employers because the workers are willing to accept low salaries and
are more likely to consent to the employer’s demands. 294
286. Underpayment 2: The Continuing Systematic Extortion of Indonesian Migrant
Workers in Hong Kong: An In-Depth Study, 30 (Sep. 2007); see also “I Was Sold,” supra note
280.
287. For an example of passport confiscation, see “I Was Sold,” supra note 280, at 1. For
confiscation of passports and crucial identity documents, see Delphi Indicators, supra note 212
(noting that confiscation of documents is a medium risk factor for both children and adults).
288. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 218.
289. Id.
290. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 15.
291. See D’Souza, supra note 29, at 28-32; see also Swept Under the Rug, supra note 117,
at 23.
292. See Trafficking in the Middle East, supra note 15, at 104; see generally Anderson &
Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11.
293. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 222. For forced labor as an indicator of exploitation,
see Delphi Indicators, supra note 212.
294. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 11. See also Hidden Slavery, supra note 43,
at 11.
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5. Emotional, Physical and Sexual Abuse
A system that places disproportionate power in the hands of
employers and isolates workers can, in the worst cases, lead to abuse
and torture. 295 Qualitative studies indicate that young domestic workers
face heightened risk of physical, psychosocial, emotional and sexual
abuse. 296 In a survey of child domestic workers in six countries, many
stated that their employers used physical punishment. 297 Physical
violence consisted of beating, pinching, kicking, whipping, scalding
with hot water, overworking, and denying food. 298 The same survey
found that CDWs often showed signs of emotional stress when
compared with a control group, including drops in their sense of
personal pride and their perceived ability to rely on adults or friends.299
Lack of support networks can also leave DWs prone to emotional
abuse, particularly where employers use ethnicity- or race-based
insults. 300 Though adult domestic workers may be able to assume risks
such as social isolation or long working hours, they cannot
unknowingly assume the risk of illegal physical, emotional or sexual
abuse at the hands of their employers. Further, anecdotal evidence
shows that cultural and social acceptance of violence as an
occupational hazard may render DWs less likely to report it, even
where they are familiar with the avenues for doing so. 301
295. See Ayaz Akbar Yousufzai, Judge Probed Over Alleged Torture of 10-year-old Maid,
GEO.TV (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.geo.tv/latest/125508-Local-courts-judge-probed-forviolence-on-10-year-old-domestic-worker [https://perma.cc/5VDA-J9EM]; see also Diana
Alghoul, Hundreds of ‘Tortured’ Bangladeshi Women Flee Saudi Arabia, THE NEW ARAB (May
2, 2017), https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2017/5/2/Hundreds-of-tortured-Banglad
eshi-women-flee-Saudi-Arabia.
296. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 213. See also Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 59
(noting that female child domestic workers in Bangladesh suffered a much higher rate of
inappropriate touching (19.6%) than male children (3.3%)).
297. Gamlin et al., supra note 274, at 218.
298. Blagbrough, supra note 241, at 186.
299. Id. at 219 (noting, however, that this wasn’t universally true – Peruvian, Philippine
and Tanzanian child domestic workers showed high levels of psychosocial satisfaction).
300. See D’Souza, supra note 29, at 24; see also Decent Work for Domestic Workers at ¶
231 (noting that temporary accommodation and a support network are crucial to help domestic
workers escape abuse).
301. D’Souza, supra note 29, at 25 (noting that “Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that
most incidents of verbal and physical abuse are not treated as violence which necessitates action,
but only as an occupational hazard”).
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Discrimination based on age, religion, gender, class, and national
origin can contribute to societal attitudes toward domestic workers.
These biases affect the value of the work done and the treatment of
DWs. 302 “Humiliation”, “treated worse than dogs” 303 and “they respect
their animals more” 304 have been used to describe the emotional abuse
domestic workers of different age groups have faced in their work.
VI. USING SIMILARITIES TO ENHANCE RIGHTS PROTECTION
The similarities above indicate that there are systemic problems
in the domestic work industry. However, governments, including
developed economies, still often fail to appropriately monitor the
industry, prevent abuse, and even punish those responsible for the
worst forms of domestic labor. 305 Evidence shows that workers can
become victims of the above abuses, regardless of their age. 306
Industry wide protection should therefore be adopted that would
respect the rights of both children and adults engaging in domestic
work. These protections should target the elimination of illegal and
exploitative domestic work.
Basic labor protections must be implemented by governments to
eradicate the worst forms of child labor in domestic work. 307 Unions
and NGOs, though playing a pivotal role, should not be solely
responsible for the eradication of these labor abuses. Advocates can use
the connection between CDWs and DWs to encourage governments to
comply with industry-wide basic labor standards they have already
agreed to abide by under the international frameworks. 308
This Note divides relevant labor rights from ILO Conventions 189
and 182 into two categories. The first are basic rights, which this Note
302. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 19 (CDWs stated that the
most difficult part of their burden is discrimination and isolation); see also Tomei, supra note
24, at 186 (arguing that classifying domestic work as ‘women’s work’ devalues the work);
Anderson & Wisniewski Otero, Coming Clean, supra note 11, at 46 (migrant domestic workers
are undervalued and receive less than half of Hong Kong’s minimum wage).
303. Zigor Aldama, Hong Kong’s Domestic Workers ‘Treated Worse Than the Dogs’,
DW.COM (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/hong-kongs-domestic-workers-treated-worsethan-the-dogs/a-18302005 [https://perma.cc/N48Q-WL3S].
304. See Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27.
305. For an analysis of the U.K’s failure to recognize, investigate, and prosecute a form of
child labor, see generally Case of C.N., supra note 273.
306. Smith, supra note 4, at 171.
307. See supra Part III.B.
308. Id.309. C182, supra note 114, preamble.
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argues have equal application to both children and adult DWs. These
rights are not intended to be exhaustive, but have been chosen as the
most pressing rights affecting both groups. These rights include the
right to be free from forced labor, the right to occupational health, the
right to social security, the right to remuneration, trade union rights and
the freedom of association, the right to gender equality and nondiscrimination, and equal treatment under the law. In the second
category, this Note places rights that are not generally applicable to or
appropriate in regard to child labor, including the rights to abode and
resident, and maternity rights. It is unlikely that domestic workers can
demand these rights in conjunction with the eradication of child labor.
By dividing rights into basic rights and rights that are not
applicable, this Note highlights which rights violations can be
affirmatively linked to child labor abuses. Achieving C182’s goal of
eradicating the most abusive forms of child labor 309 would have
industry-wide impacts that would also prevent adult DWs from falling
into conditions of labor exploitation.
Here, there are two points of note. First, it is crucial that any
government regulation not be so stringent as to push the industry
underground. For example, if registering a CDW with a government
entity necessitated that a labor inspector be able to enter the home
without notice at any time, employers would be unlikely to comply
with the registration regulations, and the practice would go unchecked.
Policies must not demonize employers, who are a crucial component in
protecting DW’s rights. Some employers, rather than seeing
themselves as exploiters of cheap child or migrant labor, may consider
themselves to be helping workers by providing them with a job and
place to live. 310 Their narrative is a crucial one to consider in suggesting
and implementing policy change.
A.

Basic Rights

Three main factors contribute to the exploitation of domestic
workers. First, a lack of regulation in the labor market. 311 Second, an
309. C182, supra note 114, preamble.
310. IDWF, Eight Good Practices, supra 236, at 56 (“[E]mployers believed that providing
CDWs with food, clothing and shelter was a social service.”).
311. DemandAT, supra note 5, at 25. See also Bridget Anderson & Julie O’ConnellDavidson, Int’l Org. for Migration [IOM], Is Trafficking in Human Beings Demand Driven?: A
Multi-Country Pilot Study, 5 (2003).
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abundance of vulnerable workers. 312 Finally, social norms allowing
abusive employer behavior. 313 Through international obligations
including ILO Conventions, governments are required both to respect
rights and to take affirmative obligations to protect DWs from abuses
by private parties. This affirmative commitment to labor and human
rights can inform a similar requirement for states to do more to protect
the fundamental rights of domestic workers in particular. This Part
provides descriptions of how rights have been interpreted in the past by
various judicial bodies, and how their application to the context of child
labor can inform stronger advocacy approaches. These descriptions
primarily address the first factor contributing to exploitation of
domestic workers: a lack of regulation in the domestic work industry,
though they also touch on the second and third.
1. Forced Labor & Freedom from Economic Exploitation
Some domestic work can rise to the level of forced labor or
economic exploitation. 314 Where migrant workers live under a
sponsorship system, they are at increased likelihood of suffering
abusive employment practices and working conditions that could
amount to forced labor. 315 The system of abuse often starts before a
domestic worker leaves their home to pursue work: “Fraud,
misinformation about the nature and terms of work, overcharging or
theft of recruitment fees, delays in departure or failure to depart
altogether all make migrant workers more vulnerable to abuse abroad
and less able to change their situations.” 316 These factors are
exacerbated by the perception of impunity for the actors who violate
human rights and labor laws. Criminal legal cases concerning
exploitation in domestic work are scarce. 317
In Siliadin v. France, a case that influenced the adoption of C189,
the European Court of Human Rights found that a woman was held in
servitude, in contravention of Article 4 of the European Convention of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) against servitude, forced, and compulsory

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Anderson & O’Connell-Davidson, supra note 311.
Id.
See infra Part IV.A(1).
The Kafala, see supra note 65, at 24-31.
PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 26.
DemandAT, supra note 5, at 26.
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labor. 318 A finding of servitude required ascertaining that there was an
obligation to perform services for others and an obligation to live on
another person’s property without the possibility of altering that
condition. 319 Siliadin migrated to France at age fifteen, and was forced
to work fifteen hours a day, seven days a week. 320 She entered France
to obtain an education, but was forced by her employer/trafficker into
domestic labor. 321 She had no money or resources, and was at the mercy
of her employers as her identity documents had been confiscated.322
The Court found that Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 323 imposed an affirmative
obligation on states to criminalize private conduct that would violate
the article. 324
Siliadin’s case may be distinguished from the typical migrant
workers’ as she did not choose to work for her employers, which led to
the condition of servitude. 325 Her case is also distinct because Europe
has more robust human rights mechanisms than its Asian, African, and
Middle Eastern counterparts where many DWs work. 326 However, the
approach in Siliadin can inform progress for realization of domestic
workers rights in other jurisdictions. Though no international human
rights court exists in either the Middle East or Asia, the UNCRC and
C182 require action in the domestic context. Because almost all
countries have agreed to prohibit forced labor and servitude,
particularly for children, Siliadin can be used as a model for requiring
that countries criminalize private conduct that would lead to
exploitation like Siliadin’s. While criminalization itself will not solve
economic exploitation, it serves a social function by rejecting the
outdated social practices of forced labor in domestic work and by
318. Siliadin v. France, Case 73316/01 [2005].
319. Id. at ¶ 123. (providing that a mandatory ‘live-in’ requirement is common among
many countries which host MDWs).
320. Id. at ¶¶ 10-14.
321. Id. at ¶ 11.
322. See id. at ¶¶ 11-15.
323. Now included in the European Human Rights Charter.
324. Siliadin, supra note 318, at ¶¶ 84-89 (“It necessarily follows from this provision that
States have positive obligations to adopt criminal law provisions which penalize the practices
referred to in Article 4 and to apply them in practice.”).
325. Id. at ¶ 126.
326. Europe has a Human Rights Convention and Court. Similar bodies include the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and its associated court, and the African People’s
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Neither Asia nor the Middle East has a similar regional
human rights body or court.
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setting standards of progressive rights realization in domestic work.
Even in jurisdictions where Siliadin is not binding, it makes a
compelling argument that countries that fail to take affirmative
obligations to eradicate slavery in domestic work will be subject to
international scrutiny.
Not all cases will be as severe as Siliadin’s, rising to the level of
forced servitude. However, a court in a country with a law
criminalizing forced servitude could similarly find that the right is
meaningless without government action to enforce the right, and
therefore encourage countries to act upon their positive obligations to
prevent servitude and compulsory labor in their territories.
Highlighting abuse cases of minors such as Siliadin, and linking these
stories with the prevention of human trafficking can encourage
governments to work to protect victims, and investigate possible
situations of trafficking or servitude in domestic work, regardless of the
age of the victim. This of course, assumes that law enforcement is
capable of recognizing and investigating coercive and forced labor. 327
A key to addressing the risk of forced labor is by formalizing the
employment relationship. 328 To address concerns of forced labor, the
ILO and other activists have advocated for written contracts as to
employment terms, which can lay out clearly the work schedule
including rest and payment periods. 329 Domestic Worker’s unions have
specifically requested formal work contracts with working conditions
clearly listed. 330 Contracts are equally important for child workers,
even where employment is short-term or part-time. 331 A written
contract, signed by both parties prior to the commencement of work,
allows DWs to have proof of the details of their work relationships and
understand the expectations of the job. 332 In the event of a conflict, it
can serve to elucidate any agency fee arrangements or obligations,
particularly where the DW was recruited by a chain of agencies or
327. See Case of C.N., supra note 273 (the British police were alerted to the circumstances
of labor trafficking on a number of occasions, but each time either failed to uncover evidence of
forced labor or otherwise found that no statute existed that would allow prosecutors to hold CN’s
trafficker accountable under criminal law).
328. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 24.
329. C189, supra note 23, art. 7 (providing that Convention 189 calls for written contracts,
where possible).
330. Id.
331. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 78.
332. Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at ¶ 216.
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subcontractors. 333 South Africa requires holistic ‘written particulars of
the work’, including a brief description of the work, ordinary hours,
rate of wages and payment method, rate for overtime, any payment in
kind, leave entitlement, period of notice upon termination, and possible
wage deductions. 334
In Malawi, CDWs of legal working age have been given formal
work contracts under an ILO program titled SNAP - ‘Support for the
National Action Plan’ 335 - undertaken as part of Malawi’s national
action plan to combat child labor. 336 The Program requires that a young
domestic worker be presented a formal contract listing working hours
and conditions, which is signed by the worker, the village chief, a
representative of child labor monitoring committee and the
employer. 337 The existence of a contract has been reported to help both
the employees understand their rights and for employers to understand
what the laws required of them. 338 Malawi’s model, designed
specifically for young workers, could inform a broader approach
calling for clear contracts for all domestic workers – the contracts don’t
expire when the workers reach the age of majority. Further, these young
workers will be empowered to ask for formal work contracts as they
become adults.
An additional solution to eradicating forced labor is to legislate,
implement, and enforce working standards, including minimum wage
and maximum working hours legislation. To enforce these standards,
governments must provide a means for detecting abusive employment
relationships, enabling submission of complaints and mandating
punishments for those in breach. C189 requires decent living
conditions and privacy, which should naturally be extended to children
workers. 339 Details about the nature of the living conditions should be
formalized in the contracts. Ensuring adequate living conditions may

333. Id. at ¶ 493.
334. Labour Dep’t of S. Africa, What you Should Know, supra note 207.
335. SNAP is a program funded by the US Department of Labor beginning in 2009.
336. ILO, Malawi: From Child Labour to Decent Work (June 12, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/multimedia/video/institutional-videos/WCMS_
215821/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. C189, supra note 23, art. 4, at 7.
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require labor inspections, as noted above, to ensure that the facilities
are as described in the contract. 340
Finally, workers must have a say in determining their living
situation – a key component of the Court’s finding of compulsive labor
in Siliadin. 341 Live-in employees’ movement and ability to enjoy
leisure time can be restricted. Lack of social and financial resources
compound this problem when abuse arises, and the worker has little
means of escape. Though not all children will be in a position to
determine their own living situation, they should be made aware of
alternatives to living and employment arrangements. Therefore, it is
important that DWs be given options about their living conditions, be
informed about their rights and options, and be empowered to know
that they can negotiate with their employers.
2. Right to Occupational Health
Domestic workers are prone to a variety of occupational hazards,
because of both the tasks undertaken and the conditions of work.342
These are particularly acute for children, who may lack the proper
education and training necessary to assess these risks and mitigate
them. 343 Under Recommendation 190, which accompanied and
elaborated on C189, hazardous work includes that which exposes
children to physical, psychological, or sexual abuse, “hazardous
substances, agents or processes” and “work under particularly difficult
conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work
where the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the
employer.” 344 The last condition directly calls for protections for
CDWs residing with their employers. R201 also highlights that special
attention must be given to workers under the age of eighteen by limiting
their hours of work, including in night work, restricting excessively
demanding work, and strengthening mechanisms to monitor working
and living conditions. 345

32.

340.
341.
342.
343.

See supra Part IV.B(1) on employer privacy & labor inspections.
Cf. Siliadin, supra note 318, ¶¶ 123-29.
See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 9.
For more on children in domestic work, see Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at

344. ILO, Recommendation 190 – Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, II(a)-(e) (June 17,
1999).
345. R201, supra note 107, art. V.2.(a)-(d).
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Domestic workers often use house cleaning chemicals that can
burn the skin and cause respiratory disorders. 346 Tasks such as carrying
heavy loads, gardening and farming with heavy equipment, cooking
with hot pans and using irons can be exhausting and dangerous,
particularly for children or those whom are not getting enough rest
time. 347 Working conditions in domestic work remain sub-standard
compared to other labor sectors. 348 A study in Vietnam reported that
common illnesses of CDWs included coughs and respiratory problems,
headaches, back pain and wounds. 349 The study found that thirty-six
percent of children had been wounded or sick during their service.350
Children in Brazil have reported chronic sleep deprivation, and
psychosocial disorders such as phobia and separation anxiety, while
CDWs in Kenya reported bedwetting, insomnia, nightmares, frequent
headaches, withdrawal and depression. 351
The ILO has called for special protection for young domestic
workers by limiting their working hours, banning night work, and
implementing restrictions on work that is excessively demanding.352
While those three protections are specifically tailored to child workers,
standard setting in this area can help legislators to view domestic work
as a human rights and gender concern, informing laws that respect
domestic workers of all ages. 353 To prevent occupational health and
safety abuses, governments should require basic safety training for all
individuals entering into domestic work, provided in multiple
languages. This can be framed in terms of benefits to employers by
highlighting that trained workers are more efficient and better able to
contribute to chores. 354 Governments could also provide a complaint
hotline for DWs to call, for example if their employer is refusing to
provide protective equipment such as gloves for handling toxic
chemicals. Governments could even go a step further, encouraging or
346. For more on risk factors see See Labour Inspection and Other Compliance
Mechanisms, supra note 84, at 10; see also Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 33-34.
347. Id. at 34.
348. Maria Gallotti & Jesse Mertens, Promoting integration for migrant domestic workers
in Europe: a synthesis of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, (International Migration Papers no.
118) (2013).
349. ILO, Survey report: Child domestic workers in Ho Chi Minh City 13 (2006).
350. Id. at 49.
351. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 34.
352. Id. at 3.
353. Id.
354. IDWF, Eight Good Practices, supra note 236, at 60.

1388 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:5

requiring domestic workers to obtain a certification before being able
to work. A model rolled out in some provinces of China offers different
levels of certifications based upon the number of training courses
completed. 355
Finally, labor inspections of work places could also prove to be
beneficial for occupational safety and health. 356 In 2011, a report from
the EU Fundamental Rights Agency examined working conditions of
irregular migrant domestic workers, and concluded that fair working
conditions should provide for labor inspections. 357 Sri Lanka has
granted authority to its National Child Protection Authority to enter and
search any premises, including homes, where it believes child abuse is
occurring. 358
3. Right to Social Security
Where workers do become sick, it is important that they have
access to social security benefits, including healthcare, particularly
where other migrant workers have such benefits. 359 As of 2013, the ILO
estimated that only ten percent of domestic workers worldwide have
equivalent protections to workers in other industries, 360 and many
countries specifically exclude domestic workers from otherwise
mandatory social security schemes. 361 Voluntary schemes are often
ineffective. Even where the domestic worker is aware of the scheme,
they face regulatory hurdles to join it, and may struggle to convince
their employers to enroll them. 362 The ILO reports that when young
domestic workers fall ill, they risk receiving little or no medical
355. See REPORT – THE STATUS OF DOMESTIC WORKERS AND DECENT WORK
CHALLENGES IN CHINA 4 (“Along with training and certification systems, the Chinese
government also urges the industry to make distinctions between different service types, publish
industry standards, and check workers certificates when recruiting new employees. In 2003,
Shenzhen published the first industry service standards for domestic workers, including a
classification of different skill levels and the requirements for attaining each classification.
Salaries can be increased commiserate with experience”).
356. See generally, supra Section II.B(1) (discussing employer privacy & labor
inspections).
357. Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 157.
358. Tackling Child Labour in Domestic Work, supra note 110, at 78.
359. Other ILO Conventions list healthcare as a right for migrant workers. See e.g. Int’l
Labour Org. Convention 97, art. 5.
360. Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 156, at 10.
361. Id. at 20.
362. Id.
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treatment, as employers prefer to treat them at home to avoid medical
costs. 363
Refusing to grant social security and health benefits to domestic
workers may serve to keep financial costs low for employers, but has
severe long term costs for workers. The ILO has sought to address lack
of social security in certain industries by recommending basic income
security for children, a nationally-defined minimum wage, and access
to nutrition, education, and care. 364 Where possible, domestic workers
should have equal protections to other workers including coverage by
social security, pensions and maternity benefits. 365 Comparing
domestic work to a business, an academic noted that “if cost does not
fall on the employer, it rests with the worker. It is hard to see why
domestic workers should be subjected to health hazards as part of their
jobs.” 366
Extending social security benefits to children may be a challenge
where children workers are considered casual workers or part-time
ones. 367 However, the narrative should be framed in a way that
employers can see the benefits of such a program. For example, if a
DW falls ill, under a social security scheme her healthcare costs would
be more affordable for the employer. This requires educating both DWs
and their employers as to the benefits of these schemes. Argentina has
a model of employer contributions that is split into three segments:
workers over sixteen and under eighteen, those eighteen and over, and
retired workers. 368 The employers of domestic workers between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen are required to pay into the health
insurance scheme, but not the pension scheme, limiting their costs.369
Uruguay’s National Health Insurance System is designed to formalize
young adult workers. 370 The system requires higher contributions for
363. Ending Child Labour, supra note 12, at 29. See also Swept Under the Rug, supra note
117, at 42.
364. THE STRATEGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, SOCIAL
SECURITY FOR ALL: BUILDING SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOORS AND COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM 53 (2012).
365. C189, supra note 23, art. 14.
366. Fredman, supra note 95, at 419.
367. See generally Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra note 154, at 21-22
(discussing social security exclusions).
368. Id. at 29-30.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 30.
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domestic workers with a spouse or children, allowing costs to remain
low for young single workers. 371
This is a challenge, however, where DWs are contract workers
and do not work in a single household. In South Africa, DWs may claim
unemployment benefits for a fixed period on dismissal if they
contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, though many
employers have failed to register their DWs. 372 Brazil’s innovative
solution provides financial incentives to employers who register their
DWs with National Social Security Institute. 373 Brazil’s scheme allows
social security payments made on behalf of a DW to be deducted from
the employer’s income tax liability. 374 Because many governments
already have social security schemes for other industries, extending
such schemes to domestic workers is a reasonable and natural
progression. Allowing employers to register young workers in
progressive, and cheaper schemes would encourage compliance.
4. Right to Remuneration
Domestic workers have the right to a minimum wage. Low pay or
no pay is common, particularly among the youngest domestic
workers. 375 Given the difficulty of researching domestic work, many
studies on child labor are unable to consider it. 376 Some domestic
workers, particularly low-skilled children, are remunerated in-kind
with accommodation, food or education costs. 377 Some employers also
371. Id.
372. See generally Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, No. 4 of 2002 (S.Afr.)
(discussing details of South Africa’s insurance fund legislation). For a mention of South Africa’s
Unemployment Insurance Fund and its extension to domestic workers, see Domestic Workers
Across the World, supra note 6, at 88; see also Social Protection for Domestic Workers, supra
note 154, at 16.
373. Fredman, supra note 95, at 408.
374. Id.
375. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 16. See also Pyae Thet Phy,
Domestic Migrant Workers in Thailand, Malaysia ‘Underpaid,’ MYANMAR TIMES, Sep. 29,
2017, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/domestic-migrant-workers-thailand-malaysia-underpai
d.html [https://perma.cc/7NH3-PNK4].
376. See e.g., IPEC-ILO, CHILD LABOUR, CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THE PERPETUATION OF
POVERTY 11 (Dec. 2007) (domestic work was not considered); see also Scott Lyon & Cristina
Valdivia, Towards the Effective Measurement of Child Domestic Workers: Building Estimates
Using Standard Household Survey Instruments (Understanding Children’s Work (UCW)
Programme, Working Paper Sept. 2010) (suggesting household surveys as a way to overcome
the information gap).
377. ILC, Report IV(1), supra note 30, at ¶ 23.
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are reported to implement a non-transparent system of salary
deductions for healthcare needs, or broken or lost household items.378
Without a contract, the terms of payment, including when and how
workers will be paid, can be unclear.
In Hounga v. Allen, a U.K. Court of Appeals (later overturned)
determined that Ms. Hounga, who was physically abused and
dismissed by her employer at age fourteen, was not entitled to salary in
arrears, because at the relevant time she did not have the right to work
in the United Kingdom. 379 The employment tribunal had earlier found
that she “knew the difference between right and wrong.” 380 This,
despite that Ms. Hounga was brought to the United Kingdom at the age
of fourteen by her employer who falsified her documents under the
pretenses of securing her education, and was never paid her the
promised wages. 381 The case was more troubling as Ms. Hounga had
low cognitive functioning and emotional difficulties. 382 Though Ms.
Hounga had made misrepresentations on immigration documents, The
Supreme Court overturned the lower court, finding that Ms. Hounga
was a trafficking victim and thus was able to pursue her claims against
the employer who trafficked her into the country. 383
South Africa could inform a workable solution. National law
requires a maximum of forty-five hours per week, fifteen over time,
and daily maximum of nine hours per day, governed by a contract.384
Weekly rest must be thirty-six consecutive hours, and they receive
twenty-one consecutive days paid annual leave per year, and unpaid
maternity leave. 385 In addition, South Africa, among other countries,
has prescribed a payment rate for on-call working hours. 386 The
government provides a fill-in contract that includes daily working
378. Id. at ¶ 24. See also As If I Am Not Human, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 14, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/14/if-i-am-not-human (“[S]ome employers make arbitrary
and illegal deductions from salaries as a disciplinary tool, to pay for a worker's medical expenses,
or to recoup recruitment fees.”) [https://perma.cc/S6SL-3AQF].
379. Hounga v. Allen [2014] UKSC 47 (Eng.).
380. Id. at ¶ 11.
381. Id. at ¶ 2, 9.
382. Id. at ¶ 8.
383. Id. at ¶ 54.
384. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 Sectorial Determination 7: Domestic
Worker Section, S. Afr., 446 GOV’T GAZETTE, No. 23732, §10(a)-(b), 16(1)(b), Aug. 15, 2002
(covering hours of work and rest periods).
385. Id. at 17(1)(b).
386. ILO, Working Hours in Domestic Work 2 (2010).
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hours with rest time. 387 Because the South African Department of
Labour lacks the capacity to conduct thorough labor inspections, it
conducts ‘blitzes’ in the domestic work industry. 388 Inspectors identify
households with domestic workers through registers at the
Unemployment Insurance Fund, and through door-to-door checks.389
Studies conducted in the country have noted that the introduction of a
minimum wage has increased domestic worker’s wages, though noncompliance still exists. 390
Though there are examples of multinational corporations settling
cases against them for abuses of child labor, there appears to be little
case law involving back pay of child domestic labor. This is certainly
not because child labor is not abused, but rather due to the practical
hurdles child workers face in accessing justice. This is a serious area
where advocacy can be enhanced. To not pay a salary to a worker is to
possibly render them in a position of forced labor. Where remuneration
is in-kind, it should be explicitly included in a contract. UNICEF was
successful in uncovering child domestic workers through a household
survey, which indicated that some less-wealthy households did not
report the presence of a CDW. 391 Thus, advocacy for a basic wage can
be targeted at employers, who may not understand that their situation
amounts to an employment relationship, or who may have little
incentive to report the employment relationship to authorities.
5. Trade Union Rights & Right to Freedom of Association
Child workers in any field lack the organizational capacity to
bargain collectively with employers, who have much greater
bargaining power. 392 Though there is often an age limit for union
participation, there have been calls by domestic workers unions to
allow for the participation of child domestic workers. 393 Latin America
has a strong movement for allowing children domestic workers to
387. LAB. DEP’T OF S. AFR., supra note 207, at 13-14.
388. DEBBIE BUDLENDERT, THE INTRODUCTION OF A MINIMUM WAGE FOR DOMESTIC
WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 20 (2016).
389. Id. at 20.
390. Id. at 21.
391. Households hosting CDWs in arrangements disguised as fostering are better off than
households of children in other forms work, but are much less wealthy than reported employer
households. Lyon & C. Valdivia, UNICEF, supra note 376, at 13.
392. See supra Part IV.A.3.
393. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 75.
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organize themselves. 394 Ideally, governments would allow domestic
workers to form their own unions, as opposed to permitting
membership in generalized unions.
As noted by the ILO, “[i]t is a growing feature of trade union
activities that they focus on a wider range of socio-economic issues that
concern their members and their families, including child labour.”395
This is partly because of globalization, but also because of changing
work environments and the roles and objectives of trade unions.
Incorporating the goals of CDWs into wider union strategy, and using
union resources to empower CDWs to represent themselves can
strengthen the connection between child labor and domestic work. This
approach could also increase cooperation and coordination between the
two groups and their advocates.
Here, recruitment agencies also play an important role, as they are
often the first point of contact for a domestic worker seeking
employment. Formal agents can be required to distribute union
information to workers before they take up employment. For workers
to have time to engage in union activities, employers must be made
aware of mandatory rest time, and a mechanism for sanctioning those
not in compliance must exist. This must be more effective and simple
than access to a labor tribunal – for example a complaint hotline in
relevant languages.
6. Non-discrimination: Right to Gender & Racial Equality
Changing societal expectations and perceptions of women, the
poor, and minority communities is crucial to expanding and protecting
the inherent dignity of DWs. Without access to affordable childcare
options, greater involvement of men, and/or secure and flexible work,
women will continue to depend on domestic workers for childcare.396
That 67.1 percent of the 17.2 million children in paid or unpaid
domestic work are female frames this squarely as a gender issue. 397
394. Id. at 59. See also Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 70 (Manthoc in Peru
and The Bhirma Sanga Association and SUMAPI in the Philippines have successfully developed
organizations for working children).
395. ILO-IPEC INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 57, at 43.
396. See Fredman, supra note 95.
397. ILO, CHILD DOMESTIC WORK: GLOBAL ESTIMATES 2012, 2 (2013). See also
DemandAT, supra note 5, at 26 (describing demand for domestic work as gendered, racialized
and ethicized); Tackling Child Labour, supra note 107, at 58-9 (“Gender discrimination is a
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Further, social attitudes toward domestic workers from lower
castes or different races can play a role in treatment of domestic
workers from outside a community. An Inter-American Court of
Human Rights report on undocumented migrants stated that exclusion
of undocumented migrants from labor rights breached international
principles of equality before the law and non-discrimination, both of
which it recognized as jus cogens norms. 398 The status of nondiscrimination as a jus cogens norm highlights the importance of
working against stereotypes that contribute to discrimination and can
lead to abuse against migrant workers. These jus cogens labor norms
of equality and non-discrimination are applicable to vulnerable DWs
including migrants and children. 399
Domestic workers are prone to gender-based violence, including
sexual assault and harassment, and multiple layers of discrimination in
the labor market including exclusion from social protections such as
reproductive healthcare. 400 A study of child domestic work in
Bangladesh found that for age groups twelve to eighteen, female
domestic workers suffered ‘bad behavior’ at the hands of employers at
a higher rate than males. 401 A solution to the ‘feminization of poverty’
is the economic empowerment of women. Because poverty is a
commonality among domestic workers, DWs are likely to be struggling
financially and more likely to send their own children into the labor
force as DWs. 402 However, only by influencing social change and
attitudes toward women and minorities can advocates limit
discrimination in the domestic work industry. Reframing the struggle
for better rights protection under gender equality and equal protection
could draw more attention to the abuses in the domestic work industry.

major cause of child domestic labour” and “a significant number of child domestic workers come
from tribal and ethnic minorities or the lower castes or classes.”).
398. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003).
399. Mantouvalou, supra note 4, at 155.
400. For more on gender-based violence, see supra Part II.V. See also U.N. Human Rights
Committee’s General Comments, 37th Sess., supra note 175, at 79 (interpreting the right to
health as including reproductive freedom).
401. Hidden Slavery, supra note 43, at 57.
402. See MARKIE, supra note 213; Tackling Child Labour, supra note 110, at 28, 53
(“Poverty is the main reason why children work.”).
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7. Right to Equal Treatment under the Law and Equality with
Locals in Legal Proceedings
Access to equal justice under the law is necessary for DWs to
assert their labor, contractual, treaty and international rights.403
However, in some systems, migrant workers are explicitly excluded
from accessing public or legal aid available to locals. 404 In some cases,
migrants are categorized and some denied access to rights that other
migrant workers have. 405 More commonly, structural hurdles create de
facto inequality. 406 Challenges in accessing justice for both migrants
and children may include language skills, inability to pay fees or living
expenses while pursuing a case, and lack of understanding of the legal
system. 407
Where migrant workers are living in a foreign country under a
sponsorship system, they may resist bringing legal complaints due to
realistic fears of retaliation, deportation, or an employer withholding
their permission for a worker to leave the country. 408 This risk is
heightened when a workers’ travel documents are confiscated. 409
Though children who migrate internally for work do not always
fear the same types of abuses due to language or their immigration
status, they face similar, if not greater, structural difficulties accessing
justice. CDW consulting groups have specifically requested greater
assistance in times of crisis, including seeking redress from abusive or
exploitative working conditions. 410 Migrants and children should have
both de jure and de facto equal access to the justice system, and fees

403. ILO, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), art. 6(1)(d)
(Jan. 22, 1952); PAOLETTI ET AL., supra note 20, at 24 (discussing access to justice).
404. For example, in the United States, some documented migrant workers under
particular visa schemes are excluded from accessing legal aid. Laura K. Abel & Risa E.
Kaufman, Preserving Aliens’ and Migrant Workers’ Access to Civil Legal Services:
Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491 (2003).
405. Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67, at 154.
406. For example, in Hong Kong, a ‘two-week rule’ requires domestic workers to leave
the territory within two weeks after being terminated, which creates a temporal barrier to rights
assertion. New Condition of Stay (NCS) (1987) (H.K).
407. See Promoting Fair Migration, supra note 67.
408. See The Kafala, supra note 65, at 36; Ricard-Guay, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that
“tied-visa system reinforced vulnerability to abuses”).
409. See Delphi Indicators, supra note 212 (confiscation of documents is a medium
indicator of forced labour).
410. Voices of Child Domestic Workers, supra note 27, at 4.
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should not be so high as to discourage complaints. 411 Where
appropriate, DWs should also have access to conciliation or mediation.
It is unreasonable to expect migrant workers to enforce their rights by
using the court system without providing them with specific
assistance. 412 Governments can improve access by providing translated
or simplified court documents, in-court translators, and public aid for
civil suits. Pro-active governments could provide rights training as part
of a qualification for undertaking domestic work. Such training need
not be equivalent for children and adults, but could take very basic
forms for child workers, and enhanced work training could be made
available for adult workers or those seeking to work abroad.
B.

Rights not Applicable

While the overlap between child and adult DWs within a rightsbased framework is overwhelming, there are a few areas in which the
groups are distinct. These include the right to abode, the right to
residence in case of loss of employment, and maternity rights. Though
minors may qualify for a temporary residency visa where they have
been trafficked across international borders, it is unlikely that such
protections would be extended to migrant workers who are willingly,
and temporarily, taking up work in another country. In some countries,
fear of migrant workers permanently settling in their host country has
been used as a justification for denial of rights. 413 Similarly, because of
complex implications for immigration policy, it is unlikely that States
would be eager to grant migrant workers rights to temporary or
permanent residence for the purposes of finding a new employer.
There will certainly be instances of women under the age of
eighteen becoming pregnant while undertaking domestic work.
However, stereotypes of and attitudes toward women who become
pregnant at a young age will likely make advocating for maternity
rights for children a controversial advocacy point. Maternity rights are

411. ILO, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), art.
9(2) (Dec. 9, 1978); ILO, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), art.
6(1)(d) (Jan. 22, 1952).
412. Labour Inspection and Other Compliance Mechanisms in the Domestic Work Sector
Introductory Guide, at 17 (2016).
413. Will Labor Reforms in the UAE Improve Life For Migrant Domestic Workers?,
WORLD POL. REV., Apr. 26, 2017.

2018]

PROTECTIONS FOR PRECARIOUS AND CDWS

1397

thus best advocated for in conjunction with improved social protection
for adult DWs.
C. Using a Rights-Based Advocacy Framework
Though social attitudes toward domestic workers and the
abundance of easily exploitable workers are difficult to change in
practice, policy-makers do have the ability to limit the exploitation of
domestic workers by improving industry oversight. 414 While activities
occurring within the home were once outside the sphere of regulation,
states are increasingly willing to oversee them, for example, in the case
of domestic violence. Despite the complexities of oversight,
governments are recognizing that they have affirmative legal
obligations to protect workers within their territory, even where those
obligations regulate and criminalize private conduct. 415
Advocates for domestic workers need to solidify the ties between
better work standards for DWs and the eradication of the worst forms
of child labor. Focusing on the human rights overlap between child
labor and domestic work can help to achieve three broad goals:
ratifying C189, holding states to account for failures under C182 and
the UNCRC to protect rights that they have agreed to abide by, and
developing domestic legislation to protect the rights of domestic
workers.
First, advocates across the domestic work industry must work
together to continue to push for ratification of C189. As opposed to the
concrete requirements in R201, C189 uses aspirational language, which
means that states have few reporting obligations or binding targets.
C189 is thus left to be interpreted in light of the local context.416
Drawing upon the human rights overlap between domestic work and
the worst forms of child labor can aid in this push by allowing states to
address the most pressing needs first. Origin countries of MDWs that
are already signatories to C189 can encourage destination countries
414. The unregulated nature of the domestic labor industry is one of three factors creating
exploitative conditions pinpointed by studies on domestic worker and sex work industries, both
of which are rife with instances of human trafficking. The other two are abundant supply of
exploitable labor and the malleability of social norms between the employers and employees.
Anderson & O’Connell-Davidson, supra note 311, at 5.
415. See Legislative Precariousness of Domestic Labor, supra note 4, at 158. An
additional example of this is the increasing recognition that domestic violence falls within the
purview of the criminal law.
416. Sharon L. Fawcett, Child Labor in Domestic Work, STOP CHILD LABOR (Sep. 10,
2013), http://stopchildlabor.org/?p=3643 [https://perma.cc/UQ8L-WYMW].
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with whom they have a labor exchange relationship to ratify. The
emotive appeal of ending child labor in domestic work and the desire
for strong labor exchange relationships can help in this regard.
Second, states are obligated to meet certain basic standards under
the UNCRC and C182. Advocates can utilize the binding frameworks
provided for in these agreements to attack lackluster regulation of the
domestic work industry. As the European Court of Human Rights
found in Siliadin and N.C., States have an affirmative duty to
criminalize exploitative labor in their territories. 417 Domestic worker
unions and civil society groups can strengthen submissions to the ILO
under C182’s biennial reporting requirement where they can link a
country’s failure to protect domestic workers with child labor abuses.
Finally, this approach can inform a basis for encouraging
legislation at a domestic level, even in countries that have not ratified
C189. This can be accomplished through advocacy, lobbying, media
campaigns and public shaming of countries with poor records of
protecting children from the worst forms of domestic work. When
legislators understand the inherent link between abusive child labor and
domestic work, they may be more open to passing protective legislation
covering the domestic work industry. In addition to encouraging
legislation, advocacy groups could ask for non-binding measures, such
as a Code of Conduct for government agencies and employers to utilize
in hiring and employing domestic workers, to be distributed to
community centers in urban communities where DWs may work. Such
a document could draw on the principles of C182 and C189 without
becoming binding law, paving the way for more binding instruments in
the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite growing awareness of the necessity to regulate the
industry, DWs remain legislatively and socially vulnerable. This Note
has strengthened the connection between abusive child labor practices
and domestic work using a human rights-based framework. Part II
defined domestic work within its historical context as informal,
feminine care work. Part III discussed the international conventions
and laws most relevant to DWs, including children involved in
domestic work. Part IV highlighted why the industry remains
417

See supra Part VI.A.1.
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challenging to regulate and thus why domestic workers remain socially
and legislatively vulnerable. Part V discussed the factors shared by
child and adult DWs that increase a worker’s risk of labor exploitation.
Part VI elaborated on the human rights applicable to all domestic
workers, and advocated a rights-based framework for regulating the
domestic work industry. This Part argued that rights-based advocacy is
an appropriate method to strengthen legislative protection for domestic
workers.
Within a rights-based framework, it is clear that states continue to
fall severely short in their duty to protect the human rights of domestic
workers. Because the domestic work industry contains some of the
most abusive child labor practices, states must regulate it to comply
with their international legal obligations. Pulling women and their
children out of poverty provides a compelling economic reason to do
so. Further, and more simply, states must adopt a more compassionate
approach to labor policies for domestic workers. It is my hope that by
doing this, states can better recognize the important contributions that
domestic workers make to our communities and economies, and
respect that contribution in both rhetoric and action.
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